aNTI MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING FINANCIAL TERRORISm
compiled by : ajoy paul, Management trainee, AB Bank limited
Chapter 1: Basics of Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing
1.1
Introduction
For most countries money laundering and terrorist financing raise
significant issues with regard o
prevention, detection and prosecution. Sophisticated techniques used to launder
money and finance terrorism add to the complexity of these issues. Such
sophisticated techniques for money laundering may involve: multiple financial
transactions, the use of different financial instruments and other kinds of
value-storing assets; different types of financial institutions, accountants,
financial advisers, shell corporations and other service providers like
remittance service; complex web of transfers to, through, and from different
countries. On the other hand, terrorism financing involves intention to provide
assets or assist in some way to do terrorist acts. A less simple concept,
however, is defining terrorism itself, because the term may have significant
political, religious, and national implications that may vary from country to
country. Money laundering and terrorist financing often display similar
transactional features, mostly having to do with concealment and disguise.
Money launderers send or try to send illicit funds through legal channels in
order to conceal their criminal origins, while those who finance terrorism
transfer funds that may be legal or illicit in origin in such a way as to
conceal their source and ultimate use. But the result is the same—reward. When
money is laundered, criminals profit from their actions; they are rewarded by
concealing the criminal act that generates the illicit proceeds and by
disguising the origins of what appear to be legitimate proceeds. Similarly,
those who finance terrorism are rewarded by concealing the origins of their
funding and disguising the financial support to carry out their terrorist
stratagems and attacks.
1.2
What is Money Laundering?
Money laundering can be defined in a number of ways. But the
fundamental concept of Money laundering is the process by which proceeds from a
criminal activity are disguised to conceal their illicit origins. Most
countries subscribe to the definition adopted by the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988)
(the Vienna Convention) and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime (2000) (the Palermo Convention):
The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property
is derived from any offense, e.g. drug trafficking, or offenses or from an act
of participation in such offense or offenses, for the purpose of concealing or
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is
involved in the commission of such an offense or offenses to evade the legal
consequences of his actions;
The concealing or disguising of the true nature, source, location,
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property,
knowing that such property is derived from an offense or offenses or from an
act of participation in such an offense or offenses, and;
The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the
time of receipt that such property was derived from an offense or offenses or
from an act of participation in such offense or offenses.
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), which
is recognized as the international standard setter for anti-money laundering
(AML) efforts, defines the term “money laundering” succinctly as “the
processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin in order to
legitimize the ill-gotten gains of crime.” Money Laundering is defined in
Section 2 (k) of the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2009 as follows:
Money
Laundering means:
i) transfer, convert, bringing/remitting funds in and out of
Bangladesh the money or properties acquired through commission of any predicate
offence1 with an intention to concealing or disguising the illicit origin of
the property or smuggle fund or property earned through legal or illegal means
to abroad;
ii) conduct, or attempt to conduct a financial transaction with an
intent to avoid a reporting requirement under this Act (the MLPA, 2009).
iii) to do or attempt to do such activities so that the
illegitimate source of the fund or property may be concealed or disguised or
knowingly assist to perform or conspire to perform such activities.
ÒgvwbjÛvwisÓ
A_©
(A) wbgoeewY©Z
D‡Ï‡k¨ Aciv‡ai mv‡_ m¤ú„³ m¤úwË ÁvZmv‡i ¯’vbvšÍi ev iƒcvšÍi ev n¯ÍvšÍi t
(1) Aciv‡ai Av‡qi A‰ea cÖK…wZ, Drm, Ae¯’vb,
gvwjKvbv I wbqš¿Y †Mvcb ev QÙve„Ë Kiv; A_ev
(2) m¤ú„³ Aciva msNU‡b RwoZ †Kvb e¨w³‡K AvBbMZ
e¨e¯’v MÖnY nB‡Z iÿvi D‡Ï‡k¨ mnvqZv Kiv;
(Av) ‰ea ev A‰ea Dcv‡q AwR©Z A_© ev m¤úwË wbqg
ewnf~©Zfv‡e we‡`‡k cvPvi Kiv;
(B) ÁvZmv‡i Acivajä Av‡qi A‰ea Drm †Mvcb ev Avovj
Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ Dnvi n¯ÍvšÍi, we‡`‡k †cÖiY ev we‡`k nB‡Z evsjv‡`‡k †cÖiY ev Avbqb
Kiv;
(C) †Kvb Avw_©K †jb‡`b GBiƒcfv‡e m¤úboe Kiv ev
m¤úboe Kwievi †Póv Kiv hvnv‡Z GB AvB‡bi Aaxb Dnv wi‡cvU© Kwievi cÖ‡qvRb nB‡e
bv;
(D) m¤ú„³ Aciva msNU‡b cÖ‡ivwPZ Kiv ev mnvqZv
Kwievi AwfcÖvq †Kvb ˆea ev A‰ea m¤úwËi iƒcvšÍi ev ¯’vbvšÍi ev n¯ÍvšÍi Kiv;
(E) m¤ú„³ Aciva nB‡Z AwR©Z Rvbv m‡Ë¡I GB ai‡bi
m¤úwË MÖnY, `L‡j †bIqv ev †fvM Kiv;
(F) GBiƒc †Kvb Kvh© Kiv hvnvi Øviv Acivajä Av‡qi
A‰ea Drm †Mvcb ev Avovj Kiv nq;
(G) Dc‡i ewY©Z †h †Kvb Aciva msNU‡b AskMÖnY,
m¤ú„³ _vKv, Aciva msNU‡b lohš¿ Kiv, msNU‡bi cÖ‡Póv A_ev mnvqZv Kiv, cÖ‡ivwPZ
Kiv ev civgk© cÖ`vb Kiv;
(e)
Òwi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vÓ A_©-
(A) e¨vsK;
(Av) Avw_©K cÖwZôvb;
(B) exgvKvix;
(C) gvwb †PÄvi;
(D) A_© A_ev A_©g~j¨ †cÖiYKvix ev ¯’vbvšÍiKvix †h
†Kvb †Kv¤úvbx ev cÖwZôvb;
(E) evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki AbygwZμ‡g e¨emv cwiPvjbvKvix Ab¨ †Kvb
cÖwZôvb;
(F) (1) ÷K wWjvi I ÷K †eªvKvi,
(2) †cvU©‡dvwjI g¨v‡bRvi I gv‡P©›U e¨vsKvi,
(3) wmwKDwiwU Kv÷wWqvb,
(4)
m¤ú` e¨e¯’vcK,
(G) (1) AjvfRbK ms¯’v/cÖwZôvb (Non Profit Organisation);
(2) †emiKvix Dboeqb ms¯’v (Non Government Organisation);
(3) mgevq mwgwZ;
(H) wi‡qj G‡÷U †W‡fjcvi;
(I) g~j¨evb avZz ev cv_‡ii e¨emv cÖwZôvb;
(J) Uªv÷ I †Kv¤úvbx †mev cÖ`vbKvix;
(AA) AvBbRxex, †bvUvix, Ab¨vb¨ AvBb †ckvRxex Ges
GKvD‡›U›U;
(AAv) miKv‡ii Aby‡gv`bμ‡g evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ…©K, mg‡q
mg‡q, weÁwß Rvixi gva¨‡g †NvwlZ Ab¨ †Kvb cÖwZôvb;
(k)
Òm¤ú„³ Aciva (Predicate offence)Ó A_© wb‡goe DwjøwLZ Aciva, hvnv
†`‡k ev †`‡ki evwn‡i msNU‡bi gva¨‡g AwR©Z †Kvb A_© ev m¤ú` jÛvwis Kiv ev Kwievi
†Póv Kiv, h_v t
(1) `ybx©wZ I Nyl;
(2) gy`ªv RvjKiY;
(3) `wjj `¯Ív‡eR RvjKiY;
(4) Puv`vevwR;
(5) cÖZviYv;
(6) RvwjqvwZ;
(7) A‰ea A‡¯¿i e¨emv;
(8) A‰ea gv`K I †bkv RvZxq `ª‡e¨i e¨emv;
(9) †PvivB I Ab¨vb¨ `ª‡e¨i A‰ea e¨emv;
(10) AcniY, A‰eafv‡e AvUKvBqv ivLv I cYe›`x Kiv;
(11) Lyb, gvivZ¥K kvixwiK ÿwZ;
(12) bvix I wkï cvPvi;
(13) †PvivKvievi;
(14) †`kx I we‡`kx gy`ªv cvPvi;
(15) Pzwi ev WvKvwZ ev `my¨Zv ev Rj`my¨Zv ev
wegvb `my¨Zv;
(16) Av`g cvPvi;
(17) †hŠZzK;
(18) †PvivPvjvbx I ïé msμvšI
Aciva;
(19) Ki msμvšI Aciva;
(20) †gav¯^Z¡ jsNb;
(21) mš¿vm I mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_© †hvMvb;
(22) †fRvj ev ¯^Z¡ jsNb K‡i cY¨ Drcv`b;
(23) cwi‡ekMZ Aciva;
(24) †hŠb wbcxob (Sexual
Exploitation);
(25) cuywR evRvi m¤úwK©Z g~j¨ ms‡e`bkxj Z_¨
Rbm¤§y‡L cÖKvwkZ nIqvi c~‡e© Zvnv Kv‡R jvMvBqv †kqvi †jb‡`‡bi gva¨‡g evRvi
myweav MÖnY I e¨w³MZ ev cÖvwZôvwbK myweavi j‡ÿ¨ evRvi wbqš¿‡Yi †Póv Kiv (Insider Trading &Market
Manipulation);
(26) msNe× Aciva (Organised
Crime) ev msNe×
Acivax `‡j AskMÖnY;
(27) fxwZ cÖ`k©‡bi gva¨‡g A_© Av`vq; Ges
(28) GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í evsjv‡`k e¨vsK
KZ„K© miKv‡ii Aby‡gv`bμ‡g †M‡R‡U cÖÁvc‡bi gva¨‡g †NvwlZ
Ab¨ †h †Kvb m¤ú„³ Aciva;
4| gvwbjÛvwis
Aciva I `Ð|(1) GB
Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í, gvwbjÛvwis GKwU Aciva ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e|
(2) †Kvb e¨w³ gvwbìvwis Aciva Kwi‡j ev gvwbìvwis
Aciva msNU‡bi †Póv, mnvqZv ev lohš¿ Kwi‡j wZwb Ab~¨b 4 (Pvi) ermi Ges AbwaK 12
(evi) ermi ch©šÍ Kviv`‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb Ges Bnvi AwZwi³ Aciv‡ai mv‡_ mswkøó m¤úwËi
wظY g~‡j¨i mgcwigvY ev 10 (`k) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ, hvnv AwaK, A_©`‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb|
(3) Av`vjZ †Kvb A_©`Ð ev `‡Ði AwZwi³ wnmv‡e `wÐZ
e¨w³i m¤úwË iv‡óªi AbyK~‡j ev‡Rqvß Kwievi Av‡`k cÖ`vb Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e hvnv cÖZ¨ÿ
ev c‡ivÿfv‡e gvwbjÛvwis ev †Kvb m¯ú„³ Aciv‡ai mv‡_ m¤ú„³ ev mswkøó|
(4) GB avivi Aaxb †Kvb mËv gvwbjÛvwis Aciva Kwi‡j
mswkøó m¤úwËi g~‡j¨i Ab~¨b wظY A_ev 20 (wek) jÿ UvKv, hvnv AwaK nq, Rwigvbv
Kiv hvB‡e Ges D³ cÖwZôv‡bi wbeÜb evwZj‡hvM¨ nB‡e|
(5) m¤ú„³ Aciv‡a Awfhy³ ev `wÐZ nIqv gvwbjÛvwis
Gi Kvi‡Y Awfhy³ ev `Ð cÖ`v‡bi c~e©kZ© nB‡e bv|
5| Aeiæ×KiY ev †μvK Av‡`k jsN‡bi `Ð|
†Kvb e¨w³ GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb †Kvb Aeiæ×KiY ev †μvK Av‡`k jsNb Kwi‡j wZwb AbwaK 3
(wZb) ermi ch©šÍ Kviv`Ð ev Aeiæ×KiY ev †μvK Av‡`kK…Z m¤úwËi g~‡j¨i mgcwigvY A_©`Ð ev Dfq `‡Ð `wÐZ
nB‡eb|
6| Z_¨ cÖKv‡ki `Ð|
(1) †Kvb e¨w³ Amr D‡Ï‡k¨ Z`šÍ m¤úwK©Z †Kvb Z_¨ ev
cÖvmswMK Ab¨ †Kvb Z_¨ †Kvb e¨w³, ms¯’v ev msev` gva¨‡g cÖKvk Kwi‡eb bv|
(2) GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb ÿgZvcÖvß †Kvb e¨w³, cÖwZôvb
ev G‡R›U KZ…©K PvKzixiZ ev wb‡qvMiZ _vKv Ae¯’vq wKsev PvKzix ev wb‡qvMRwbZ Pzw³
Aemvq‡bi ci ZrKZ…©K msM„nxZ, cÖvß, AvnwiZ, ÁvZ †Kvb Z_¨ GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iY
e¨ZxZ Ab¨ †Kvb D‡Ï‡k¨ e¨envi ev cÖKvk Kiv nB‡Z weiZ _vwK‡eb|
(3) †Kvb e¨w³ Dc-aviv (1) I (2) Gi weavb jsNb
Kwi‡j wZwb AbwaK 2 (`yB) ermi ch©šÍ Kvi`Ð ev Ab~aŸ© 50 (cÂvk) nvRvi UvKv ch©šÍ
A_©`Ð ev Dfq `‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb|
7| Z`‡šÍ evav ev Amn‡hvwMZv,
cÖwZ‡e`b †cÖi‡Y e¨_©Zv ev Z_¨ mieiv‡n evav †`Iqvi`Ð|
(1) †Kvb e¨w³ GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb
(K)
†Kvb Z`šÍ Kvh©μ‡g Z`šÍKvix Kg©KZ©v‡K evav cÖ`vb
Kwi‡j ev mn‡hvwMZv cÖ`v‡b A¯^xK…wZ Ávcb Kwi‡j; ev
(L)
hyw³msMZ KviY e¨wZ‡i‡K hvwPZ †Kvb cÖwZ‡e`b †cªi‡Y ev Z_¨ mieiv‡n A¯^xK…wZ Ávcb
Kwi‡j; wZwb GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb Aciva Kwiqv‡Qb ewjqv MY¨ nB‡eb|
(2)
†Kvb e¨w³ Dc-aviv (1) Gi Aaxb Aciv‡a †`vlx mve¨¯Í nB‡j wZwb AbwaK 1 (GK) ermi
ch©šÍ Kviv`Ð ev Ab~aŸ© 25 (cuwPk) nvRvi UvKv ch©šÍ A_©`Ð ev Dfq `‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb|
8| wg_¨v Z_¨ cÖ`v‡bi `Ð|
(1)
†Kvb e¨w³ ÁvZmv‡i A‡_©i Drm ev wbR cwiwPwZ ev wnmve avi‡Ki cwiwPwZ m¤ú‡K© ev
†Kvb wnmv‡ei myweav‡fvMx ev bwgbx m¤ú‡K© †Kvbiƒc wg_¨v Z_¨ cÖ`vb Kwi‡eb bv|
(2)
†Kvb e¨w³ Dc-aviv (1) Gi weavb jsNb Kwi‡j wZwb AbwaK 3 (wZb) ermi ch©šÍ Kviv`Ð
ev Ab~aŸ© 50 (cÂvk) nvRvi UvKv ch©šÍ A_©`Ð ev Dfq `‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb|
9| Aciv‡ai Z`šÍ I wePvi:
(1)
Ab¨ AvB‡b hvnv wKQyB _vKzK bv †Kb GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb Acivamg~n `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb
AvBb, 2004 (2004 m‡bi 5bs AvBb) Gi Aaxb Zdwmjfy³ Aciva M‡Y¨ `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb
ev Kwgkb nB‡Z Z`y‡Ï‡k¨ ÿgZvcÖvß Kwgk‡bi †Kvb Kg©KZ©v ev `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb nB‡Z
ÿgZvcÖvß Ab¨ †Kvb Z`šÍKvix ms¯’vi Kg©KZ©v KZ…©K Z`šÍ‡hvM¨ nB‡e|
(2)
GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb Acivamg~n Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Act XL of 1958) Gi section
3 Gi Aaxb wbhy³
†¯úkvj RR KZ…©K wePvh© nB‡e|
(3)
Awfhy³ e¨w³i m¤úwË AbymÜvb I mbv³Ki‡Yi wbwgË `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki
cvkvcvwk `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb AvBb, 2004 (2004 m‡bi 5bs AvBb) G cÖ`Ë ÿgZvI cÖ‡qvM
Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb nB‡Z ÿgZvcÖvß Ab¨ †Kvb Z`šÍKvix ms¯’vi
Kg©KZ©v GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki cvkvcvwk Ab¨ AvB‡b cÖ`Ë ÿgZvI cÖ‡qvM Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|
10| †¯úkvj RR Gi we‡kl GLwZqvi:
(1)
†¯úkvj RR GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb Aciv‡ai Rb¨ wba©vwiZ `Ð Av‡ivc Ges †ÿÎgZ, AwaKZi
Z`šÍ, m¤úwË Aeiæ×KiY, †μvK, ev‡RqvßKiY Av‡`kmn Avek¨K Ab¨
†Kvb Av‡`k cÖ`vb Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb|
(2)
†¯úkvj RR GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb `v‡qiK…Z †Kvb gvgjvq AwaKZi Z`‡šÍi Av‡`k cÖ`vb
Kwi‡j D³iƒc Av‡`‡k Z`šÍKvix Kg©KZ©v‡K Z`šÍ cÖwZ‡e`b `vwL‡ji Rb¨ GKwU mgqmxgv
wbw`©ó Kwiqv w`‡eb, hvnv 6 (Qq) gv‡mi AwaK nB‡e bv|
11| Aciv‡ai Avgj‡hvM¨Zv, A-Av‡cvl‡hvM¨Zv I A-Rvwgb‡hvM¨Zv:
GB
Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb Acivamg~n Avgj‡hvM¨ (cognizable), A-Av‡cvl‡hvM¨
(non-compoundable) Ges A-Rvwgb‡hvM¨ (non-bailable) nB‡e|
22| Avcxj:
AvcvZZt
ejer Ab¨ †Kvb AvB‡b hvnv wKQB _vKzb bv †Kb, Av`vjZ KZ…©K GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb cÖ`Ë
†Kvb Av‡`k, ivq, wWwμ ev Av‡ivwcZ `Û Øviv msÿzä cÿ,
D³iƒc Av‡`k, ivq, wWwμ ev `Ûv‡`k cÖ`v‡bi ZvwiL nB‡Z 30
(wÎk) w`‡bi g‡a¨ nvB‡KvU© wefv‡M Avcxj Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|
23| gvwbjÛvwis Aciva `gb I cÖwZ‡iv‡a evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki ÿgZv I
`vwqZ¡:
(1)
GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki wbgoeiƒc ÿgZv I `vwqZ¡ _vwK‡e, h_v
t
(K)
†Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v nB‡Z cÖvß bM` †jb‡`b I m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z
Z_¨vw` we‡kølY ev ch©v‡jvPbv I we‡kølY ev ch©v‡jvPbvi D‡Ï‡k¨ AwZwi³ †h †Kvb Z_¨
wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v nB‡Z msMÖn Ges Dnvi WvUv msiÿY Kiv Ges †ÿÎgZ, mswkøó
AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’v‡K cÖ‡qvRbxq Kvh©μg MÖn‡Yi Rb¨ D³ Z_¨vw` cÖ`vb Kiv;
(L)
†Kvb †jb‡`b gvwbjÛvwis ev †Kvb m¤ú„³ Aciva Gi mwnZ m¤ú„³ ewjqv aviYv Kwievi
hyw³msMZ KviY _vwK‡j wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v nB‡Z D³iƒc †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z †h †Kvb
Z_¨ ev cÖwZ‡e`b msMÖn Kiv;
(M)
†Kvb Aciva msNU‡bi gva¨‡g †Kvb A_© ev m¤úwË †Kvb wnmv‡e Rgv nBqv‡Q g‡g© m‡›`n
Kwievi hyw³msMZ KviY _vwK‡j †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v‡K AbwaK 30 (wÎk) w`‡bi
Rb¨ D³ wnmv‡ei †jb‡`b ¯’wMZ ev Aeiæ× ivwLevi wb‡`©k cÖ`vb Kiv t
Z‡e
kZ© _v‡K †h, D³ wnmv‡ei †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z mwVK Z_¨ DrNvU‡bi cÖ‡qvRb †`Lv w`‡j
†jb‡`b ¯’wMZ ev Aeiæ× ivwLevi †gqv` AwZwi³ 30 (wÎk) w`b Kwiqv m‡e©v”P 6 (Qq)
gvm ewa©Z Kiv hvB‡e;
(N)
gvwbjÛvwis cÖwZ‡iva Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v‡K, mgq mgq, cÖ‡qvRbxq
wb‡`©kbv cÖ`vb Kiv;
(O)
wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ…©K hvwPZ Z_¨ ev cÖwZ‡e`b mwVKfv‡e †cÖiY
Kwiqv‡Q wKbv wKsev Z`&KZ…©K cÖ`Ë wb‡`©kbv h_vh_fv‡e cwicvjb Kwiqv‡Q wKbv
Zvnv Z`viwK Kiv Ges cÖ‡qvR‡b, wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v m‡iRwgb cwi`k©b Kiv;
(P)
GB AvB‡bi myôz cÖ‡qvM wbwðZ Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vmn evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki
we‡ePbvq †h †Kvb ms¯’v ev cÖwZôv‡bi Kg©KZ©v I Kg©Pvix‡`i Rb¨ cÖwkÿ‡Yi e¨e¯’vmn
mfv, †mwgbvi, BZ¨vw`i Av‡qvRb Kiv;
(Q)
GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í cÖ‡qvRbxq Ab¨ †h †Kvb Kvh© m¤úv`b Kiv|
(2)
gvwbjÛvwis ev m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b Z`‡šÍ Z`šÍKvix ms¯’v †Kvb Z_¨ mieiv‡ni Aby‡iva Kwi‡j,
cÖPwjZ AvB‡bi AvIZvq ev hw` Ab¨ †Kvb Kvi‡Y eva¨eva¨KZv bv _v‡K, Zvnv nB‡j
evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ Z_¨ cÖ`vb Kwi‡e|
(3)
†Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v GB avivi Aaxb †Kvb hvwPZ Z_¨ h_vmg‡q mieivn Kwi‡Z e¨_©
nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v‡K cÖwZw`b 10 (`k) nvRvi UvKv wnmv‡e m‡e©v”P 5
(cuvP) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges †Kvb ms¯’v 1 (GK) A_© erm‡i 3
(wZb) ev‡ii AwaK Rwigvbvi m¤§yLxb nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v ev ms¯’vi †Kvb
kvLv, mvwf©m †m›Uvi, ey ev G‡R‡›Ui evsjv‡`‡k Kvh©μg cwiPvjbv iwnZ Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨
wbeÜb ev jvB‡mÝ ¯’wMZ Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e ev †ÿÎgZ, wbeÜbKvix ev jvB‡mÝ cÖ`vbKvix
KZ…©cÿ‡K D³ ms¯’vi weiæ‡× h_vh_ e¨e¯’v MÖn‡Yi wbwgË welqwU AewnZ Kwi‡e|
(4)
†Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v GB avivi Aaxb hvwPZ wel‡q †Kvb fyj ev wg_¨v Z_¨ ev
weeiYx mieivn Kwi‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v‡K Ab~¨b 20 (wek) nvRvi UvKv I
m‡e©v”P 5 (cuvP) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges †Kvb ms¯’v 1 (GK) A_©
erm‡I 3 (wZb) ev‡ii AwaK Rwigvbvi m¤§yLxb nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v ev
ms¯’vi †Kvb kvLv, mvwf©m †m›Uvi, ey ev G‡R‡›Ui evsjv‡`‡k Kvh©μg cwiPvjbv iwnZ Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ wbeÜb ev jvB‡mÝ ¯’wMZ Kwi‡Z
cvwi‡e ev †ÿÎgZ, wbeÜbKvix ev jvB‡mÝ cÖ`vbKvix KZ…©cÿ‡K D³ ms¯’vi weiæ‡× h_vh_ e¨e¯’v
MÖn‡Yi wbwgË welqwU AewnZ Kwi‡e|
(5)
†Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ…©K GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki AvIZvq RvixK…Z
†Kvb wb‡`©kbv cwicvj‡b e¨_© nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v‡K cÖwZw`b 10 (`k)
nvRvi UvKv wnmv‡e m‡e©v”P 5 (cuvP) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ cÖwZwU Acwicvjbxq wel‡qi Rb¨
Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges †Kvb ms¯’v 1 (GK) A_© erm‡i 3 (wZb) ev‡ii AwaK
Rwigvbvi m¤§yLxb nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v ev ms¯’vi †Kvb kvLv, mvwf©m
†m›Uvi, ey ev G‡R‡›Ui evsjv‡`‡k Kvh©μg cwiPvjbv iwnZ Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ wbeÜb
ev jvB‡mÝ ¯’wMZ Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e ev †ÿÎgZ, wbeÜbKvix ev jvB‡mÝ cÖ`vbKvix KZ…©cÿ‡K
D³ ms¯’vi weiæ‡× h_vh_ e¨e¯’v MÖn‡Yi wbwgË welqwU AewnZ Kwi‡e|
(6)
†Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v Dc-aviv (1) Gi `dv (M) Gi AvIZvq evsjv‡`k e¨vsK
KZ…©K wb‡`©wkZ †Kvb Aeiæ× ev ¯’wMZ Av‡`k cwicvj‡b e¨_© nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³
wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v‡K Ab~¨b D³ e¨vsK wnmv‡e w¯’wZi mgcwigvY Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z
cvwi‡e hvnv wb‡`k©bv Rvixi Zvwi‡L wnmv‡e w¯’wZi wظ‡Yi AwaK nB‡e bv|
(7)
GB AvB‡bi aviv 23 I 25 Abyhvqx evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ…©K Av‡ivwcZ Rwigvbv †Kvb&
e¨w³ ev mËv ev wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v cÖ`v‡b e¨_© nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK mswkøó
e¨w³ ev mËv ev wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi wbR bv‡g †h †Kvb e¨vsK ev Avw_©K
cÖwZôvb ev evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡K cwiPvwjZ wnmve weKjbc~e©K Av`vq Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges
G‡ÿ‡Î Rwigvbvi †Kvb Ask Abv`vqx _vwK‡j Zvnv Av`v‡q
cÖ‡qvR‡b
evsjv‡`k e¨vsK Av`vj‡Z Av‡e`b Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges Av`vjZ †hBiƒc Dchy³ we‡ePbv
Kwi‡e †mBiƒc Av‡`k cÖ`vb Kwi‡e|
(8)
Dc-aviv (3), (4), (5) I (6) Abyhvqx †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v‡K Rwigvbv Kiv
nB‡j GB Rb¨ `vqx D³ ms¯’vi gvwjK, cwiPvjK, Kg©KZ©v-Kg©Pvix ev Pzw³wfwËK wb‡qvwRZ
e¨w³M‡Yi weiæ‡×I evsjv‡`k e¨vsK Ab~¨b 10(`k) nvRvi UvKv I m‡ev©”P 5(cuvP) jÿ
UvKv ch©šÍ Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges cÖ‡qvR‡b mswkøó ms¯’v‡K cÖ‡qvRbxq cÖkvmwbK
e¨e¯’v MÖn‡Yi Rb¨ wb‡`©kbv cÖ`vb Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|
24| evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU (BFIU)
cÖwZôv:
(1)
GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki aviv 23 G evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki Dci Awc©Z ÿgZv I `vwqZ¡ cwicvj‡bi j‡ÿ¨
evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡K evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU (Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit
ev BFIU) bv‡g GKwU ¯^Zš¿ BDwbU _vwK‡e|
(2)
GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í miKvwi, Avav-miKvwi, ¯^vqËkvwmZ ms¯’vmg~n ev Ab¨
†Kvb mswkøó cÖwZôvb ev ms¯’v Z`&KZ…©K msiwÿZ ev msM„nxZ Z_¨vw` evsjv‡`k
dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU‡K ¯^cÖ‡bvw`Zfv‡e ev Aby‡iv‡ai m~‡Î mieivn Kwi‡e|
(3)
evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU Ab¨vb¨ AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’v‡K gvwb jÛvwis
I mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_© †hvMvb mswkøó Z_¨vw` cÖ‡qvR‡b ¯^-D‡`¨v‡M mieivn Kwi‡Z
cvwi‡e|
(4)
GB AvB‡bi weavb Abyhvqx Ab¨ †Kvb †`‡ki mwnZ m¤úvw`Z †Kvb Pyw³ ev e¨e¯’vi Aaxb
mswkøó †`‡ki dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU‡K gvwbjÛvwis ev mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vqb ev
†Kvb m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z Z_¨vw` mieivn Kwi‡e Ges Ab¨ †Kvb †`‡ki wbKU nB‡Z
Abyiƒc Z_¨ Pvwn‡Z cwi‡e|
(5)
Dc-aviv (4) G ewY©Z Pyw³ ev e¨e¯’v QvovI evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU
†ÿÎgZ, ¯^cÖ‡Yvw`Zfv‡e Ab¨ †`‡ki dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU‡K Z_¨ mieivn Kwi‡Z
cvwi‡e|
25| gvwbjÛvwis Aciva cÖwZ‡iv‡a wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi
`vq-`vwqZ¡:
(1)
gvwbjÛvwis Aciva cÖwZ‡iv‡a wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi wbgoeiƒc `vq-`vwqZ¡ _vwK‡e,
h_v t
(K)
Dnvi MÖvn‡Ki wnmve cwiPvjbvKv‡j MÖvn‡Ki cwiwPwZi mwVK I c~Y©v½ Z_¨ msiÿY Kiv;
(L)
†Kvb MÖvn‡Ki wnmve eÜ nB‡j eÜ nBevi ZvwiL nB‡Z Ab~¨b 5 (cuvP) ermi ch©šÍ D³
wnmv‡ei †jb‡`b msμvšI Z_¨ msiÿY Kiv;
(M)
`dv (K) I (L) Gi Aaxb msiwÿZ Z_¨vw` evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki Pvwn`v †gvZv‡eK, mgq mgq,
mieivn Kiv;
(N)
aviv 2 (h) G msÁvwqZ †Kvb m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b ev †jb‡`‡bi cÖ‡Póv cwijwÿZ nB‡j
¯^-D‡`¨v‡M Awej‡¤^ evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡K Ôm‡›`nRbK †jb`b wi‡cvU©Õ Kiv|
(2)
†Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v Dc-aviv (1) Gi weavb jsNb Kwi‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK-
(K)
D³ ms¯’v‡K Ab~¨b 50 (cÂvk) nvRvi UvKv Ges m‡e©v”P 25 (cuwPk) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ
Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e; Ges
(L)
`dv (K) Gi Aaxb Av‡ivwcZ Rwigvbvi AwZwi³ D³ ms¯’v ev ms¯’vi †Kvb kvLv, mvwf©m
†m›Uvi, ey ev G‡R‡›Ui e¨emvwqK Kvh©μ‡gi AbygwZ ev jvB‡mÝ evwZj Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e ev †ÿÎgZ,
wbeÜbKvix ev jvB‡mÝ cÖ`vbKvix KZ…©cÿ‡K D³ ms¯’vi weiæ‡× h_vh_ e¨e¯’v MÖn‡Yi
wbwg‡Ë welqwU AewnZ Kwi‡e|
(3)
Dc-aviv (2) Gi Aaxb Av‡ivwcZ Rwigvbvi A_© evsjv‡`k e¨vsK ZrKZ…©K wba©vwiZ c×wZ‡Z
Av`vq Kwi‡e Ges Av`vqK…Z A_© ivóªxq †KvlvMv‡i Rgv Kwi‡e|
1.3
What Is Terrorist Financing
Terrorist financing can be simply defined as financial support in
any form of terrorism or of those who
encourage, plan, or engage in terrorism. The International Convention for 1
Predicate offence is the underlying criminal activity that generated proceeds,
which when laundered, results in the offense of money laundering.
the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism (1999) under the United Nations defines TF in the
following manner:
1. If any person commits an offense by any means, directly or
indirectly, unlawfully and willingly, provides or collects funds with the
intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be
used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
a. An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as
defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or
b. Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury
to a civilian, or to any other person not taking any active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by
its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act.
2. (Deleted by UN)
3. For an act to constitute an offense set forth in the preceding
paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that the funds were actually used to
carry out an offense referred to in said paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b)2.
Some countries face difficulties in defining terrorism as not all
countries have adopted the conventions agreed on specifically what actions
constitute terrorism. In addition, the meaning of terrorism is not universally
accepted due to significant political, religious and national implications that
differ from country to country. FATF, which is recognized as the international
standard setter for combating financing of terrorism (CFT) efforts, does not
specifically define the term financing of terrorism in its nine Special Recommendations
on Terrorist Financing (Special Recommendations). Nonetheless, FATF urges
countries to ratify and implement the 1999 United Nations International Convention
for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Thus, the above definition is the
one most countries have adopted for purposes of defining terrorist financing.
According to the article 7 of the Anti Terrorism Act, 2009, financing
of terrorism means:
2 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (1999), Article,http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm. The
treaties referred to annex in sub‐paragraph 1(a) shall be available in this web
link.
(1) Whoever provides or incites to provide money, service or
property and intends that it should be used, or has reasonable ground to
suspect that it will or may be used for the purpose of terrorist acts; commits
an act of terrorist financing.
(2) Whoever receives money, service or property and intends that
it should be used, or has reasonable ground to suspect that it will or may be
used for the purpose of terrorist acts; commits an act of terrorist financing.
(3) Whoever arranges money, service or property and intends that
it should be used, or has reasonable ground to suspect that it will or may be
used for the purpose of terrorist acts; commits an act of terrorist financing.
(4) A person guilty of the offence as described in the subsections
from 1 to 3 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
twenty years and it shall not be less than three years, to which fine may also
be added.
4| 2009 m‡bi 16 bs AvB‡bi aviv 5 Gi cÖwZ¯’vcb|⎯ D³
AvB‡bi aviv 5 Gi cwie‡Z© wbgoeiƒc aviv 5 cÖwZ¯’vwcZ nB‡e, h_v t⎯
Ò5| AwZivwóªK cÖ‡qvM|⎯(1) hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv
evsjv‡`‡ki evwni nB‡Z evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨šÍ‡i †Kvb Aciva msNUb K‡i hvnv D³ e¨w³ ev
mËv KZ…©K evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨šÍi nB‡Z msNwUZ nB‡j GB AvB‡bi Aaxb kvw¯Í‡hvM¨ nBZ,
Zvnv nB‡j D³ Aciva evsjv‡`‡k msNwUZ nBqv‡Q ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e Ges D³ e¨w³ ev mËv I
Aciv‡ai †ÿ‡Î GB AvB‡bi weavbvejx cÖ‡hvR¨ nB‡e|
(2)
hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨šÍi nB‡Z evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i †Kvb Aciva msNUb
K‡i, hvnv evsjv‡`‡k msNwUZ nB‡j GB AvB‡bi Aaxb kv¯Í‡hvM¨ nBZ, Zvnv nB‡j D³
Aciva evsjv‡`‡k msNwUZ nBqv‡Q ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e Ges D³ e¨w³ ev mËv I Aciv‡ai †ÿ‡Î
GB AvB‡bi weavbvejx cÖ‡hvR¨ nB‡e|Ó|
6| 2009 m‡bi 16 bs AvB‡bi aviv 7 Gi cÖwZ¯’vcb⎯
D³
AvB‡bi aviv 7 Gi cwie‡Z© wbgoeiƒc aviv 7
cÖwZ¯’vwcZ nB‡e, h_v t⎯
Ò7| mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vqb msμvšI Aciva|⎯
(1) hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv ÁvZmv‡I Ab¨ †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv‡K
A_©, †mev-e¯‘MZ mnvqZv (material
support), ev Ab¨
†Kvb m¤úwË mieivn K‡ib ev mieiv‡ni AwfcÖvq cÖKvk K‡ib hvnv‡Z Bnv wek¦vm Kwievi
hyw³m½Z KviY _v‡K †h, Dnv m¤ú~Y© ev AvswkKfv‡e †Kvb mš¿vmx e¨w³ ev mËv ev †Mvôx
ev msMVb KZ…©K †h †Kvb D‡Ï‡k¨ e¨envi Kiv nBqv‡Q ev nB‡Z cv‡i, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb ev
D³ mËv mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vq‡bi Aciva msNUb Kwiqv‡Qb ewjqv MY¨ nB‡eb| 2| hw` †Kvb
e¨w³ ev mËv ÁvZmv‡i Ab¨ †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËvi wbKU nB‡Z A_©, †mev, e¯‘MZ mnZvq (material
support) , ev Ab¨
†Kvb m¤úwË MÖnY K‡ib hvnv‡Z Bnv wek¦vm Kwievi hyw³m½Z KviY _v‡K †h, Dnv m¤ú~Y©
ev AvswkKfv‡e †Kvb mš¿vmx e¨w³ ev mËv ev †Mvôx ev msMVb KZ…©K †h †Kvb D‡Ï‡k¨
e¨envi Kiv nBqv‡Q ev nB‡Z cv‡i, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb ev D³ mËv mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vq‡bi
Aciva msNUb Kwiqv‡Qb ewjqv MY¨ nB‡eb|
(3)
hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv ÁvZmv‡i Ab¨ †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËvi Rb¨ A_©, †mev, e¯‘MZ mnvqZv
(material
support), ev Ab¨
†Kvb m¤úwËi e¨e¯’v K‡ib hvnv‡Z Bnv wek¦vm Kwievi hyw³m½Z KviY _v‡K †h, Dnv
m¤ú~Y© ev AvswkKfv‡e †Kvb mš¿vmx e¨w³ ev mËv ev †Mvôx ev msMVb KZ…©K †h †Kvb
D‡Ï‡k¨ e¨envi Kiv nBqv‡Q ev nB‡Z cv‡i, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb ev D³ mËv mš¿vmx Kv‡h©
A_©vq‡bi Aciva msNUb Kwiqv‡Qb ewjqv MY¨ nB‡eb|
(4)
hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv ÁvZmv‡i Ab¨ †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv‡K A_©, †mev, e¯‘MZ mnvqZv (material
support), ev Ab¨
†Kvb m¤úwË mieivn ev MÖnY ev e¨e¯’v Kwievi †ÿ‡Î Ggbfv‡e cÖ‡ivwPZ K‡ib hvnv‡Z
Bnv wek¦vm Kwievi hyw³msMZ KviY _v‡K †h, Dnv m¤ú~Y© ev AvswkKfv‡e †Kvb mš¿vmx
e¨w³ ev mËv ev †Mvôx ev msMVb KZ…©K †h †Kvb D‡Ï‡k¨ e¨envi Kiv nBqv‡Q ev nB‡Z
cv‡i, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb ev D³ mËv mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vq‡bi Aciva msNUb Kwiqv‡Qb ewjqv
MY¨ nB‡eb|
(5)
Dc-aviv (1) nB‡Z (4) G ewY©Z Aciv‡a †Kvb e¨w³ †`vl mve¨¯Í nB‡j, D³ e¨w³ AbwaK
wek ermi I Ab~¨b Pvi ermi ch©šÍ †h †Kvb †gqv‡`i Kviv`‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb, Ges Bnvi
AwZwi³ Aciv‡ai mwnZ mswkøó m¤úwËi wظY g~‡j¨i mgcwigvY ev 10(`k) jÿ UvKv, hvnv
AwaK, †mB cwigvY A_©`ÐI Av‡ivc Kiv hvB‡e|
(6)
(K) Dc-aviv (1) nB‡Z (4) G ewY©Z Aciv‡a †Kvb mËv †`vlx mve¨¯Í nB‡j aviv 18 Gi
weavb Abyhvqx e¨e¯’v MÖnY Kiv hvB‡e Ges Bnvi AwZwi³ Aciv‡ai mwnZ mswkøó m¤úwËi
wZb¸Y g~‡j¨i mgcwigvY ev 50 (cÂvk) jÿ UvKv, hvnv AwaK, †mB cwigvY A_©`ÐI Av‡ivc
Kiv hvB‡e; Ges
(6)
(L) D³ mËvi cÖavb, Zvnv‡K †Pqvig¨vb, e¨e¯’vcbv cwiPvjK, cÖavb wbe©vnx ev Ab¨ †h
†Kvb bv‡g WvKv nBK bv †Kb, wZwb AbwaK wek ermi I Ab~¨b Pvi ermi ch©šÍ †h †Kvb
†gqv‡`i Kviv`‡Û `wÐZ nB‡eb, Ges Bnvi AwZwi³ Aciv‡ai mwnZ mswkøó m¤úwËi wظY
g~‡j¨i mgcwigvY ev 20 (wek) jÿ UvKv, hvnv AwaK, †mB cwigvY A_©`‡ÐI `wÐZ nB‡eb
hw` bv wZwb cÖgvY Kwi‡Z mÿg nb †h, D³ Aciva Zvnvi AÁvZmv‡i msNwUZ nBqv‡Q A_ev
D³ Aciva †iva Kwievi Rb¨ wZwb h_vmva¨ †Póv Kwiqv‡Qb|Ó|
8| 2009 m‡bi 16 bs AvB‡bi aviv
15 Gi cÖwZ¯’vcb ⎯ D³ AvB‡bi aviv 15 Gi
cwie‡Z©
wbgoeiƒc aviv 15 cÖwZ¯’vwcZ nB‡e, h_v t⎯
Ò15| evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki ÿgZv ⎯
(1) GB AvB‡bi Aaxb †Kvb Aciva msNU‡bi D‡Ï‡k¨ †Kvb wi‡cvU©
cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi gva¨‡g †jb‡`b cÖwZ‡iva I mbv³ Kwi‡Z evsjv‡`k e¨vsK cÖ‡qvRbxq
c`‡ÿc MÖnY Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges GZ`y‡Ï‡k¨ Dnvi wbgoeewY©Z ÿgZv I KZ…©Z¡ _vwK‡e, h_v
t⎯
(K)
†Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v nB‡Z m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z cÖwZ‡e`b Zje Kiv;
(L)
Dc-`dv (K) Abyhvqx cÖvß cÖwZ‡e`b mswkøó AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’v‡K cÖ‡qvRbxq Kvh©μg MÖn‡Yi Rb¨ cÖ`vb Kiv ev †ÿÎgZ,
ˆe‡`wkK AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’vi Aby‡iv‡ai †cÖwÿ‡Z D³ ms¯’v‡K cÖ`vb Kiv ev D³
cÖwZ‡e`‡bi wel‡q Z_¨ wewbgq Kiv;
(M)
mKj cwimsL¨vb I †iKW© msKjb I msiÿY Kiv;
(N)
mKj m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z wi‡cv‡U©i WvUv-†eR m„wó I iÿYv‡eÿY Kiv;
(O)
m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z cÖwZ‡e`b we‡kølY Kiv;
(P)
†Kvb †jb‡`b mš¿vmx Kv‡h©i mwnZ m¤ú„³ g‡g© m‡›`n Kwievi hyw³m½Z KviY _vwK‡j
mswkøó wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v‡K D³ †jb‡`‡bi wnmve AbwaK 30 (wÎk) w`‡bi Rb¨
¯’wMZ ev Aeiæ× ivwLevi D‡Ïk¨ wjwLZ Av‡`k Rvix Kiv Ges GBiƒ‡c D³ wnmv‡ei †jb‡`b
m¤úwK©Z mwVK Z_¨ D˜NvU‡bi cÖ‡qvRb †`Lv w`‡j †jb‡`b ¯’wMZ ev Aeiæ× ivwLevi †gqv`
AwZwi³
30 (wÎk) w`b Kwiqv m‡e©v”P 6(Qq) gvm ewa©Z Kiv;
(Q)
wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi Kvh©vejx cwiexÿY I Z`viK Kiv;
(R)
mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_© †hvMvb cÖwZnZ Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ cÖwZ‡ivag~jK c`‡ÿc MÖn‡Y wi‡cvU©
cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vmg~n‡K wb‡`©k cÖ`vb Kiv;
(S)
mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vq‡bi mwnZ RwoZ m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b mbv‡³i D‡Ï‡k¨ wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix
ms¯’vmg~n cwi`k©b Kiv; Ges
(T)
mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_© †hvMv‡bi mwnZ RwoZ m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b mbv³ I cÖwZ‡iv‡ai D‡Ï‡k¨
wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vmg~‡ni Kg©KZ©v I Kg©PvixMY‡K cÖwkÿY cÖ`vb Kiv|
(2)
evsjv‡`k e¨vsK, mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_© †hvMv‡bi mwnZ RwoZ m‡›`nRbK †Kvb †jb‡`‡bi welq
†Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v ev Bnvi MÖvnK‡K mbv³ Kwievi m‡½ m‡½, Dnv h_vh_
AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’v‡K AewnZ Kwi‡e Ges AbymÜvb I Z`šÍ Kv‡h© D³ AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix
ms¯’v‡K cÖ‡qvRbxq mKj cÖKvi mn‡hvwMZv cÖ`vb Kwi‡e|
(3)
Ab¨ †`‡k msNwUZ wePvivaxb Aciv‡ai †ÿ‡Î evsjv‡`k e¨vsK miKvi KZ…©K M„nxZ †Kvb
AvšÍR©vwZK, AvÂwjK ev wØ-cvwÿK Pzw³, RvwZms‡Ni Kb‡fbkb ev RvwZms‡Ni wbivcËv cwil`
KZ…©K M„wnZ mswkøó †iRy‡jk‡bi AvIZvq †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËvi wnmve Rã Kivi D‡`¨vM
MÖnY Kwi‡e|
(4)
Dc-aviv (3) Gi AvIZvq RãK…Z A_© mswkøó Pzw³, Kb‡fbkb ev RvwZms‡Ni wbivcËv cwil`
KZ…©K M„wnZ mswkøó †iRy‡jk‡bi Av‡jv‡K mswkøó Av`vjZ KZ…©K wb®úwˇhvM¨ nB‡e|
(5)
Dc-aviv (1) nB‡Z (3) G ewY©Z `vwqZ¡ m¤úv`‡bi ¯^v‡_© miKvwi, AvavmiKvwi,
¯^vqËkvwmZ ms¯’v evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj Bb&‡Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU‡K Z`&KZ„K© hvwPZ
Z_¨vw` mieivn Kwi‡e, ev †ÿÎgZ, ¯^cÖ‡Yvw`Z nBqv Z_¨vw`
mieivn
Kwi‡e|
(6)
evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj Bb&‡Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU Pvwn`v Abyhvqx ev †ÿÎgZ,
¯^cÖ‡Yvw`Zfv‡e mš¿vmx Kvh© ev mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vqb m¤ú„³ Z_¨vw` Ab¨ ‡`‡ki
dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU‡K mieivn Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|
(7)
mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vq‡bi wel‡q Z`‡šÍi ¯^v‡_© †Kvb AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’v KZ…©K †Kvb
e¨vs‡Ki `wjj ev †Kvb bw_‡Z wbgoeewY©Z k‡Z© cÖ‡ekvwaKvi _vwK‡e, h_v t⎯
(K)
Dchy³ Av`vjZ ev UªvBey¨bv‡ji Av‡`kμ‡g; A_ev
(L)
evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki Aby‡gv`bμ‡g|Ó|
9| 2009 m‡bi 16 bs AvB‡bi aviv 16 Gi cÖwZ¯’vcb ⎯D³ AvB‡bi aviv 16 Gi
cwie‡Z©
wbgoeiƒc aviv 16 cÖwZ¯’vwcZ nB‡e, h_v t⎯
Ò16| wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi `vwqZ¡ -
(1) †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi gva¨‡g GB AvB‡bi Aaxb
†Kvb Aciv‡ai mwnZ RwoZ A_© †jb‡`b cÖwZ‡iva I mbv³ Kwievi j‡ÿ¨ cÖ‡Z¨K wi‡cvU©
cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v h_vh_ mZK©Zv I `vwqZ¡kxjZvi mwnZ cÖ‡qvRbxq e¨e¯’v MÖnY Kwi‡e
Ges †Kvb m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b wPwýZ nB‡j ¯^cÖ‡Yvw`Z nBqv †Kvb cªKvi wej¤^ e¨wZ‡i‡K
evsjv‡`k e¨vsK‡K wi‡cvU© Kwi‡e|
(2)
cÖ‡Z¨K wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi cwiPvjbv cwil` (Board of Directors) ev cwiPvjbv cwil‡`i Abycw¯’wZ‡Z
cÖavb wbe©vnx, ev Ab¨ †h bv‡g WvKv nDK bv †Kb, Dnvi Kg©KZ©v‡`i `vwqZ¡ m¤úwK©Z
wb‡`©kbv Aby‡gv`b I Rvix Kwi‡e, Ges aviv 15 Gi Aaxb evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ…©K
RvixK…Z wb‡`©kbv, hvnv wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vmg~‡ni Rb¨ cÖ‡hvR¨, cÖwZcvjb Kiv
nB‡Z‡Q wKbv Dnv wbwðZ Kwi‡e|
(3)
†Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v aviv 15 Gi Aaxb evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ©„K cÖ`Ë †h †Kvb
wb‡`©kbv cvjb Kwi‡Z e¨_© nB‡j ev ÁvZmv‡i †Kvb fyj Z_¨ mieivn A_ev wg_¨v Z_¨ ev weeiYx
mieivn Kwi‡j, D³ wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ„K© wba©vwiZ I wb‡`©wkZ
AbwaK 10 (`k) jÿ UvKv Rwigvbv cwi‡kva Kwi‡Z eva¨ _vwK‡e Ges evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³
ms¯’v ev ms¯’vi †Kvb kvLv, mvwf©m †m›Uvi, ey ev G‡R‡›Ui evsjv‡`‡k Kvh©μg cwiPjbv iwnZ Kwievi D‡Ïk¨
wbeÜb ev jvB‡mÝ ¯’wMZ Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e ev †ÿÎgZ, wbeÜbKvix ev jvB‡mÝ cÖ`vbKvix
KZ©„cÿ‡K D³ ms¯’vi weiæ‡× h_vh_ e¨e¯’v MÖn‡Yi wbwgË welqwU AewnZ Kwi‡e|
(4)
Dc-aviv (3) †gvZv‡eK evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ„K© Av‡ivwcZ Rwigvbv †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix
ms¯’v cwi‡kva Kwi‡Z e¨_© nB‡j ev cwi‡kva bv Kwi‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK mswkøó wi‡cvU©
cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi wbR bv‡g †h †Kvb e¨vsK ev Avw_©K cÖwZôvb ev evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡K cwiPvwjZ
wnmve weKjbc~e©K Av`vq Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges D³ Rwigvbvi †Kvb Ask Abv`vqx _vwK‡j Dnv
Av`v‡q, cÖ‡qvR‡b, evsjv‡`k e¨vsK mswkøó Av`vj‡Z Av‡e`b Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|Ó|
1.4 The Link between
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
The techniques used to launder money are essentially the same as
those used to conceal the sources of, and uses for, terrorist financing. Funds
used to support terrorism may originate from legitimate sources, criminal
activities, or both. Nonetheless, disguising the source of terrorist financing,
regardless of whether the source is of legitimate or illicit origin, is
important. If the source can be concealed, it remains available for future terrorist
financing activities. Similarly, it is important for terrorists to conceal the
use of the funds so that the financing activity goes undetected.
For these reasons, FATF has recommended that each country
criminalizes the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist
organizations, and designates such offenses as predicate offenses of money
laundering. Finally, FATF has stated that the nine Special Recommendations
combined with The Forty Recommendations on money laundering constitute the
basic framework for preventing, detecting and suppressing both money laundering
and terrorist financing.
As noted above, a significant difference between money laundering
and terrorist financing is that the funds involved in terrorist financing may
originate from legitimate sources as well as criminal activities. Such
legitimate sources may include donations or gifts of cash or other assets to
persons/organizations (e.g. foundations or charities) to support terrorist
activities.
1.5 The reason of
committing money laundering
Criminals engage in money laundering for three main reasons:
First, money
represents the lifeblood of the organization that engages in criminal conduct for
financial gain because it covers operating expenses, replenishes inventories,
purchases the services of corrupt officials to escape detection and further the
interests of the illegal enterprise, and pays for an extravagant lifestyle. To
spend money in these ways, criminals must make the money they derived illegally
appear legitimate.
Second, a
trail of money from an offense to criminals can become incriminating evidence. Criminals
must obscure or hide the source of their wealth or alternatively disguise
ownership or control to ensure that illicit proceeds are not used to prosecute them.
Third, the
proceeds from crime often become the target of investigation and seizure. To shield
ill-gotten gains from suspicion and protect them from seizure, criminals must conceal
their existence or, alternatively, make them look legitimate.
1.6 The reason of committing terrorism financing
Terrorism financing is done mainly to facilitate an extremist
group by providing financial support aiming to establish or circulate their
ideology. Such financial assistance may be provided directly or indirectly or
may be attempted and amount of money may be significantly low with several in
numbers.
1.7 Laundering Techniques
Obviously there is no single way of laundering money or any other
property. It can range from the simple method to highly complex schemes
involving a web of international businesses and investments. In general, money
laundering process comprises three stages:
Placement –
placing the criminal funds into the financial system directly or indirectly.
Layering –
the process of separating criminal proceeds from their source by using complex
layers of financial transactions designed to hide the audit trail and provide
anonymity.
Integration – if
the layering process succeeds, integration schemes place the laundered proceeds
back into the legitimate economy in such a way that they appear to be
legitimate.
This “three stages model” is more often occur simultaneously or
overlap depending on the facilities of the launderer, the requirements of the
criminals, and on the robustness, or otherwise, of the regulatory and legal
requirements.
Chapter 2: Vulnerabilities of ML/TF
2.1 Introduction
Criminals
and terrorists succeed largely in concealing the origins or sources of their
funds and sanitize the proceeds by moving them through national and
international financial systems. Money laundering and the financing of
terrorism have particularly significant economic and social consequences for a
developing country like Bangladesh. The absence of, or a lax in AML/CFT regime
in a particular country encourages criminals and terrorists to operate and
expand their criminal pursuits fostering illegal activities such as corruption,
drug trafficking, illicit trafficking and exploitation of human beings, arms trafficking,
smuggling.
2.2 The Adverse Implications for Developing Countries
The
magnitude of the adverse impact of money laundering and terrorist financing
cannot be quantified with the precisions. There are so many adverse effects of
money laundering and terrorist financing for a developing country like
Bangladesh. Some of them are describes below:
2.2.1 Increased Crime and Corruption
If
money laundering is prevalent in a country, it enhances crime and corruption in
different ways. To the extent that a country is viewed as a safe haven for
money laundering, it is likely to attract criminals and promote corruption.
Safe haven includes-
weak
AML/CFT framework,
little
enforcement of AML/CFT provisions,
limited
number of predicate offences,
limited
inclusion of reporting institutions,
ineffective
penalties etc.
A
comprehensive and effective AML/CFT framework, together with timely implementation
and effective enforcement significantly reduce the profitable aspects of criminal
activities and discourage criminals and terrorists. This is especially true
when the proceeds from criminal activities are aggressively confiscated and
forfeited as part of a country’s overall AML/CFT legal framework.
2.2.2 Non-cooperation from Foreign Counterparts
Foreign
financial institutions may decide to limit their transactions with institutions
from money laundering havens, subject these transactions to extra scrutiny
making them more expensive, or terminate correspondent or lending relationships
altogether. Even legitimate businesses and enterprises from money laundering
havens may suffer from reduced access to world markets or access at a higher
cost due to extra scrutiny of their ownership, organization and control
systems.
Any
country known for lax enforcement of AML/CFT is less likely to receive foreign private
investment. For developing nations, eligibility for foreign governmental assistance
is also likely to be severely limited.
Foreign
direct investment and foreign aid may be reduced or withdrawn because of lax enforcement
of AML/CFT measures.
Finally,
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering maintains a list of
countries that do not comply with AML requirements or that do not cooperate sufficiently
in the fight against money laundering i.e. “non-cooperating countries and territories”
(NCCT) list, gives public notice that the listed country does not have in place
even minimum standards. Beyond the negative impacts referred to here,
individual FATF member countries could also impose specific counter-measures
against a country that does not take action to remedy its AML/CFT deficiencies.
2.2.3 Compromised Economy and Private Sector
Money
launderers may use front companies3 to co-mingle the illicit funds with
legitimate funds in order to hide the ill-gotten proceeds, not to earn profit.
Access to illicit funds let front companies to subsidize the front company’s
products and services, even at belowmarket prices. As a consequence, legitimate
companies find it difficult to compete with such front companies. Thus by using
front companies and other investments in legitimate companies money laundering
proceeds can be utilized to control whole industry or sectors of the economy of
certain countries. This increases the potential for monetary and economic
instability due to the misallocation of resources from artificial distortions
in asset and commodity prices. It also provides a vehicle for evading taxation,
thus depriving the country of revenue.
3
Business enterprises that appear legitimate and engage in legitimate business
but are, in fact, controlled by criminals
2.2.4. Damaged Privatization Efforts
Money
launderers threaten the efforts of many countries to reform their economies through
privatization. These criminal organizations are capable of outbidding
legitimate purchasers of former state-owned enterprises. When illicit proceeds
are invested in this manner, criminals increase their potential for more
criminal activities and corruption, as well as deprive the country of what
should be legitimate, market-based, taxpaying enterprise.
2.3 Vulnerabilities of Remittance Business
2.3.1.
One of the main techniques commonly used at present is the conversion of large
amounts of criminal proceeds in local currency into low bulk foreign currencies
for physical smuggling out of the country. Some countries also evidenced the
use of international money orders and mail services to send large sums of cash
abroad.
2.3.2.
Remittances is often used in the layering process. One of the most popular techniques
is simply to transfer illicit funds through several different remittance operators
to disguise the trail to the funds’ original sources.
2.3.3.
Another method is to make transfers from numerous accounts to a principal collection
account which is often located in offshore financial centre.
2.3.4.
Transfers are also made under false identities and sometimes it becomes difficult
to identify the actual recipient of the funds.
2.3.5.
Remittance operators, which traditionally encompass the non-banking segment of
the population, notably immigrant workers or any other person having no bank
account often transfer funds to the countries where banking services are less
regulated. Looking at the vulnerability of remittance service industry, the
respective institutions should therefore be more vigilant to evolving money
laundering and financing of terrorism threats to prevent their institutions
from being abused to facilitate money laundering and financing of terrorism
activities.
2.4 The Benefits of an Effective AML/CFT Framework
A
strong AML/CFT institutional framework that includes a broad scope of predicate
offenses for money laundering helps to fight against crime and corruption. An
effective AML/CFT regime is deterrent to criminal activities. In this regard,
confiscation and forfeiture of money laundering proceeds impedes to earn
profits from criminal activities, thereby reducing the incentive to commit
criminal acts.
In
addition, an effective AML/CFT regime reduces the possibilities of losses to
the institutions originating from fraudulent activities. Proper customer
identification procedures and determination of beneficial ownership provide
specific due diligence for higher risk policies and ensure monitoring for
suspicious activities. Such prudential internal controls play a vital role for
the safe and sound operation of a financial institution. This enhances public
confidence and permits investments to be put into productive purposes that
respond to consumer needs and help the productivity of the overall economy.
AML and CFT Policy of AB Bank Limited
==================================================================================================================================
BFIU & AML Circulars
BFIU Circular- 1/2012 Dated- January 30, 2012
Regarding the
formation of Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit in replace of AML Dept.
BFIU Circular- 2/2012 Dated- March 15, 2012
Anti Money Laundering
Act & Anti Terrorism (amenedment) Act 2012.
AML
Circular- 01/2002 Dated- May 18, 2002
Money Laundering
Prevention Act - 2002
AML
Circular- 02/2002 Dated- July 17, 2002
KYC, Legal
Identification, Personal Information, Business Information, Transaction
information, Proof of address, ETP, STR & Not to disclose the STR related
information to any one, Transaction Monitoring, establishment of CCU in Head
Office, CAMLCO & BAMLCO and Training & Record Keeping.
AML
Circular- 03/2002 Dated- December 10, 2002
- It is amendment of
Circular-02.
- Certificate issued
by the trespectable person of the society acceptable to the Bank/FI subject to
their satisfaction.
AML
Circular- 04/2002 Dated- December 23, 2002
Co-operation to
investigate the crime related to Money Laundering.
AML
Circular- 05/2003 Dated- May 22, 2003
Amendment of Money
Laundering Prevention Act - 2002
AML
Circular- 06/2005 Dated- July 24, 2005
KYC Procedures
AML
Circular- 07/2005 Dated- August 14, 2005
Corresponding Banking/
Shell Banking
AML
Circular- 08, 09, 10
Cash Transaction
Reporting Procedures]
AML
Circular- 11/2007 Dated- February 20, 2007
Freezing of Accounts
under emergency rule - 2007
AML
Circular- 12/2007 Dated- September 20, 2007
AML (amendment)
ordinance – 2007.
AML
Circular- 13/2007 Dated- September 24,
2007
CTR threshold extended
from Tk. 5.00 lac to Tk. 7.00 lac and above effective from September, 2007.
AML
Circular- 14/2007 Dated- September 24, 2007
-
PEPs Definition :
Individuals who
are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign
country, for example Heads of State or of government, senior government,
judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important
political party officials. Business relationships with family members or close
associates of PEPs involve reputational risks similar to those with PEPs
themselves.
-
Approval from HO
-
FATF recommendation
-2012 domestic PEPs
-
Beneficial Owners
of PEPs.
AML
Circular- 15/2008 Dated- March 24, 2008
Self assessment &
Independent testing
AML
Circular- 16/2008 Dated- April 29, 2008
AML Ordinance – 2008.
AML
Circular- 17/2008 Dated- June 29, 2008
Anti Terrorism
Ordinance - 2008
AML
Circular- 18/2008 Dated- August 10, 2008
Included Insurance
Company as Reporting Agency
AML
Circular- 19/2008 Dated- August 14, 2008
-
Instruction to
Bank & FIs according to AML Ordinance-2008 & Anti terrorism
Ordinance-2008.
-
Latest STR form
-
CFT
rsponsibilities- CCU & CAMLCO
-
Staff
responsibility to be circulated by the Board of Directors.
AML
Circular- 20/2008 Dated- August 14, 2008
Instruction to Money
changer according to AML Ordinance-2008 & Anti terrorism Ordinance-2008.
AML
Circular- 21/2009 Dated- April 21, 2009
Money Laundering
Prevention Act – 2009 published in Bangladesh Gagette.
AML
Circular- 22/2009 Dated- April 21, 2009
Anti Terrorism Act
-2009 published in Bangladesh Gagette.
AML
Circular- 23/2010 Dated- February 23, 2010
Completing KYC
Procedures of Accounts which opened before April 30, 2002.
AML
Circular- 24/2010 Dated- March 03, 2010
-
Definition of
Customer
-
Beneficial
owner/controller of owner
-
CDD (Customer due
diligence), EDD
-
Corresponding
Banking
-
Screening
Mechanism for new recruitment
-
Customer
awareness
AML
Circular- 25/2010 Dated- May 30, 2010
USD 50,000.00 or above
in fav. Of Electronic Media
AML
Circular- 26/2010 Dated- September 30, 2010
Area of predicate
offence & Reporting Agency extended/included newly.
AML
Circular- 27/2011 Dated- June 15, 2011
Instruction to the
Non-Government Organization (NGO) and Non-Profit Organization (NPO) for
compliance of AML/CFT.
AML
Circular- 28/2011 Dated- July 05, 2011
Guidance Notes on AML
& CFT for Insurance Companies.
AML
Circular- 29/2011 Dated- September 27, 2011
Guidance Notes on Anti
Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism for Money Changers.
