Saturday, July 21, 2012

ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING FINANCIAL TERRORISM


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aNTI MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING FINANCIAL TERRORISm

compiled by : ajoy paul, Management trainee, AB Bank limited


Chapter 1: Basics of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

1.1 Introduction
For most countries money laundering and terrorist financing raise significant issues with regard  o prevention, detection and prosecution. Sophisticated techniques used to launder money and finance terrorism add to the complexity of these issues. Such sophisticated techniques for money laundering may involve: multiple financial transactions, the use of different financial instruments and other kinds of value-storing assets; different types of financial institutions, accountants, financial advisers, shell corporations and other service providers like remittance service; complex web of transfers to, through, and from different countries. On the other hand, terrorism financing involves intention to provide assets or assist in some way to do terrorist acts. A less simple concept, however, is defining terrorism itself, because the term may have significant political, religious, and national implications that may vary from country to country. Money laundering and terrorist financing often display similar transactional features, mostly having to do with concealment and disguise. Money launderers send or try to send illicit funds through legal channels in order to conceal their criminal origins, while those who finance terrorism transfer funds that may be legal or illicit in origin in such a way as to conceal their source and ultimate use. But the result is the same—reward. When money is laundered, criminals profit from their actions; they are rewarded by concealing the criminal act that generates the illicit proceeds and by disguising the origins of what appear to be legitimate proceeds. Similarly, those who finance terrorism are rewarded by concealing the origins of their funding and disguising the financial support to carry out their terrorist stratagems and attacks.

1.2 What is Money Laundering?

Money laundering can be defined in a number of ways. But the fundamental concept of Money laundering is the process by which proceeds from a criminal activity are disguised to conceal their illicit origins. Most countries subscribe to the definition adopted by the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) (the Vienna Convention) and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) (the Palermo Convention):
The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from any offense, e.g. drug trafficking, or offenses or from an act of participation in such offense or offenses, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offense or offenses to evade the legal consequences of his actions;
The concealing or disguising of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such an offense or offenses, and;
The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt that such property was derived from an offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such offense or offenses.
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), which is recognized as the international standard setter for anti-money laundering (AML) efforts, defines the term “money laundering” succinctly as “the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin in order to legitimize the ill-gotten gains of crime.” Money Laundering is defined in Section 2 (k) of the Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2009 as follows:

Money Laundering means:
i) transfer, convert, bringing/remitting funds in and out of Bangladesh the money or properties acquired through commission of any predicate offence1 with an intention to concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or smuggle fund or property earned through legal or illegal means to abroad;
ii) conduct, or attempt to conduct a financial transaction with an intent to avoid a reporting requirement under this Act (the MLPA, 2009).
iii) to do or attempt to do such activities so that the illegitimate source of the fund or property may be concealed or disguised or knowingly assist to perform or conspire to perform such activities.

ÒgvwbjÛvwisÓ A_􀁿©
(A) wbgoeewY©Z D‡Ï‡k¨ Aciv‡ai mv‡_ m¤ú„³ m¤úwË ÁvZmv‡i ¯’vbvšÍi ev iƒcvšÍi ev n¯ÍvšÍi t
(1) Aciv‡ai Av‡qi A‰ea cÖK…wZ, Drm, Ae¯’vb, gvwjKvbv I wbqš¿Y †Mvcb ev QÙve„Ë Kiv; A_ev
(2) m¤ú„³ Aciva msNU‡b RwoZ †Kvb e¨w³‡K AvBbMZ e¨e¯’v MÖnY nB‡Z iÿvi D‡Ï‡k¨ mnvqZv Kiv;
(Av) ‰ea ev A‰ea Dcv‡q AwR©Z A_© ev m¤úwË wbqg ewnf~©Zfv‡e we‡`‡k cvPvi Kiv;
(B) ÁvZmv‡i Acivajä Av‡qi A‰ea Drm †Mvcb ev Avovj Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ Dnvi n¯ÍvšÍi, we‡`‡k †cÖiY ev we‡`k nB‡Z evsjv‡`‡k †cÖiY ev Avbqb Kiv;
(C) †Kvb Avw_©K †jb‡`b GBiƒcfv‡e m¤úboe Kiv ev m¤úboe Kwievi †Póv Kiv hvnv‡Z GB AvB‡bi Aaxb Dnv wi‡cvU© Kwievi cÖ‡qvRb nB‡e bv;
(D) m¤ú„³ Aciva msNU‡b cÖ‡ivwPZ Kiv ev mnvqZv Kwievi AwfcÖvq †Kvb ˆea ev A‰ea m¤úwËi iƒcvšÍi ev ¯’vbvšÍi ev n¯ÍvšÍi Kiv;
(E) m¤ú„³ Aciva nB‡Z AwR©Z Rvbv m‡Ë¡I GB ai‡bi m¤úwË MÖnY, `L‡j †bIqv ev †fvM Kiv;
(F) GBiƒc †Kvb Kvh© Kiv hvnvi Øviv Acivajä Av‡qi A‰ea Drm †Mvcb ev Avovj Kiv nq;
(G) Dc‡i ewY©Z †h †Kvb Aciva msNU‡b AskMÖnY, m¤ú„³ _vKv, Aciva msNU‡b lohš¿ Kiv, msNU‡bi cÖ‡Póv A_ev mnvqZv Kiv, cÖ‡ivwPZ Kiv ev civgk© cÖ`vb Kiv;

(e) Òwi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vÓ A_©-
(A) e¨vsK;
(Av) Avw_©K cÖwZôvb;
(B) exgvKvix;
(C) gvwb †PÄvi;
(D) A_© A_ev A_©g~j¨ †cÖiYKvix ev ¯’vbvšÍiKvix †h †Kvb †Kv¤úvbx ev cÖwZôvb;
(E) evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki AbygwZμ‡g e¨emv cwiPvjbvKvix Ab¨ †Kvb cÖwZôvb;
(F) (1) ÷K wWjvi I ÷K †eªvKvi,
(2) †cvU©‡dvwjI g¨v‡bRvi I gv‡P©›U e¨vsKvi,
(3) wmwKDwiwU Kv÷wWqvb,
(4) m¤ú` e¨e¯’vcK,
(G) (1) AjvfRbK ms¯’v/cÖwZôvb (Non Profit Organisation);
(2) †emiKvix Dboeqb ms¯’v (Non Government Organisation);
(3) mgevq mwgwZ;
(H) wi‡qj G‡÷U †W‡fjcvi;
(I) g~j¨evb avZz ev cv_‡ii e¨emv cÖwZôvb;
(J) Uªv÷ I †Kv¤úvbx †mev cÖ`vbKvix;
(AA) AvBbRxex, †bvUvix, Ab¨vb¨ AvBb †ckvRxex Ges GKvD‡›U›U;
(AAv) miKv‡ii Aby‡gv`bμ‡g evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ…©K, mg‡q mg‡q, weÁwß Rvixi gva¨‡g †NvwlZ Ab¨ †Kvb cÖwZôvb;

(k) Òm¤ú„³ Aciva (Predicate offence)Ó A_© wb‡goe DwjøwLZ Aciva, hvnv †`‡k ev †`‡ki evwn‡i msNU‡bi gva¨‡g AwR©Z †Kvb A_© ev m¤ú` jÛvwis Kiv ev Kwievi †Póv Kiv, h_v t

(1) `ybx©wZ I Nyl;
(2) gy`ªv RvjKiY;
(3) `wjj `¯Ív‡eR RvjKiY;
(4) Puv`vevwR;
(5) cÖZviYv;
(6) RvwjqvwZ;
(7) A‰ea A‡¯¿i e¨emv;
(8) A‰ea gv`K I †bkv RvZxq `ª‡e¨i e¨emv;
(9) †PvivB I Ab¨vb¨ `ª‡e¨i A‰ea e¨emv;
(10) AcniY, A‰eafv‡e AvUKvBqv ivLv I cYe›`x Kiv;
(11) Lyb, gvivZ¥K kvixwiK ÿwZ;
(12) bvix I wkï cvPvi;
(13) †PvivKvievi;
(14) †`kx I we‡`kx gy`ªv cvPvi;
(15) Pzwi ev WvKvwZ ev `my¨Zv ev Rj`my¨Zv ev wegvb `my¨Zv;
(16) Av`g cvPvi;
(17) †hŠZzK;
(18) †PvivPvjvbx I ïé msμvšI Aciva;
(19) Ki msμI Aciva;
(20) †gav¯^Z¡ jsNb;
(21) mš¿vm I mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_© †hvMvb;
(22) †fRvj ev ¯^Z¡ jsNb K‡i cY¨ Drcv`b;
(23) cwi‡ekMZ Aciva;
(24) †hŠb wbcxob (Sexual Exploitation);
(25) cuywR evRvi m¤úwK©Z g~j¨ ms‡e`bkxj Z_¨ Rbm¤§y‡L cÖKvwkZ nIqvi c~‡e© Zvnv Kv‡R jvMvBqv †kqvi †jb‡`‡bi gva¨‡g evRvi myweav MÖnY I e¨w³MZ ev cÖvwZôvwbK myweavi j‡ÿ¨ evRvi wbqš¿‡Yi †Póv Kiv (Insider Trading &Market Manipulation);
(26) msNe× Aciva (Organised Crime) ev msNe× Acivax `‡j AskMÖnY;
(27) fxwZ cÖ`k©‡bi gva¨‡g A_© Av`vq; Ges
(28) GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ„K© miKv‡ii Aby‡gv`bμ‡g †M‡R‡U cÖÁvc‡bi gva¨‡g †NvwlZ Ab¨ †h †Kvb m¤ú„³ Aciva;




4| gvwbjÛvwis Aciva I |(1) GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í, gvwbjÛvwis GKwU Aciva ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e|
(2) †Kvb e¨w³ gvwbìvwis Aciva Kwi‡j ev gvwbìvwis Aciva msNU‡bi †Póv, mnvqZv ev lohš¿ Kwi‡j wZwb Ab~¨b 4 (Pvi) ermi Ges AbwaK 12 (evi) ermi ch©šÍ Kviv`‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb Ges Bnvi AwZwi³ Aciv‡ai mv‡_ mswkøó m¤úwËi wظY g~‡j¨i mgcwigvY ev 10 (`k) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ, hvnv AwaK, A_©`‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb|
(3) Av`vjZ †Kvb A_©`Ð ev `‡Ði AwZwi³ wnmv‡e `wÐZ e¨w³i m¤úwË iv‡óªi AbyK~‡j ev‡Rqvß Kwievi Av‡`k cÖ`vb Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e hvnv cÖZ¨ÿ ev c‡ivÿfv‡e gvwbjÛvwis ev †Kvb m¯ú„³ Aciv‡ai mv‡_ m¤ú„³ ev mswkøó|
(4) GB avivi Aaxb †Kvb mËv gvwbjÛvwis Aciva Kwi‡j mswkøó m¤úwËi g~‡j¨i Ab~¨b wظY A_ev 20 (wek) jÿ UvKv, hvnv AwaK nq, Rwigvbv Kiv hvB‡e Ges D³ cÖwZôv‡bi wbeÜb evwZj‡hvM¨ nB‡e|
(5) m¤ú„³ Aciv‡a Awfhy³ ev `wÐZ nIqv gvwbjÛvwis Gi Kvi‡Y Awfhy³ ev `Ð cÖ`v‡bi c~e©kZ© nB‡e bv|

5| Aeiæ×KiY ev †μvK Av‡`k jsN‡bi `Ð|􀁿
†Kvb e¨w³ GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb †Kvb Aeiæ×KiY ev †μvK Av‡`k jsNb Kwi‡j wZwb AbwaK 3 (wZb) ermi ch©šÍ Kviv`Ð ev Aeiæ×KiY ev †μvK Av‡`kK…Z m¤úwËi g~‡j¨i mgcwigvY A_©`Ð ev Dfq `‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb|

6| Z_¨ cÖKv‡ki `Ð|
(1) †Kvb e¨w³ Amr D‡Ï‡k¨ Z`šÍ m¤úwK©Z †Kvb Z_¨ ev cÖvmswMK Ab¨ †Kvb Z_¨ †Kvb e¨w³, ms¯’v ev msev` gva¨‡g cÖKvk Kwi‡eb bv|
(2) GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb ÿgZvcÖvß †Kvb e¨w³, cÖwZôvb ev G‡R›U KZ…©K PvKzixiZ ev wb‡qvMiZ _vKv Ae¯’vq wKsev PvKzix ev wb‡qvMRwbZ Pzw³ Aemvq‡bi ci ZrKZ…©K msM„nxZ, cÖvß, AvnwiZ, ÁvZ †Kvb Z_¨ GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iY e¨ZxZ Ab¨ †Kvb D‡Ï‡k¨ e¨envi ev cÖKvk Kiv nB‡Z weiZ _vwK‡eb|
(3) †Kvb e¨w³ Dc-aviv (1) I (2) Gi weavb jsNb Kwi‡j wZwb AbwaK 2 (`yB) ermi ch©šÍ Kvi`Ð ev Ab~aŸ© 50 (cÂvk) nvRvi UvKv ch©šÍ A_©`Ð ev Dfq `‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb|
7| Z`‡šÍ evav ev Amn‡hvwMZv, cÖwZ‡e`b †cÖi‡Y e¨_©Zv ev Z_¨ mieiv‡n evav †`Iqvi`Ð|
(1) †Kvb e¨w³ GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb􀁿
(K) †Kvb Z`šÍ Kvh©μ‡g Z`šÍKvix Kg©KZ©v‡K evav cÖ`vb Kwi‡j ev mn‡hvwMZv cÖ`v‡b A¯^xK…wZ Ávcb Kwi‡j; ev
(L) hyw³msMZ KviY e¨wZ‡i‡K hvwPZ †Kvb cÖwZ‡e`b †cªi‡Y ev Z_¨ mieiv‡n A¯^xK…wZ Ávcb Kwi‡j; wZwb GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb Aciva Kwiqv‡Qb ewjqv MY¨ nB‡eb|

(2) †Kvb e¨w³ Dc-aviv (1) Gi Aaxb Aciv‡a †`vlx mve¨¯Í nB‡j wZwb AbwaK 1 (GK) ermi ch©šÍ Kviv`Ð ev Ab~aŸ© 25 (cuwPk) nvRvi UvKv ch©šÍ A_©`Ð ev Dfq `‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb|

8| wg_¨v Z_¨ cÖ`v‡bi `Ð|
(1) †Kvb e¨w³ ÁvZmv‡i A‡_©i Drm ev wbR cwiwPwZ ev wnmve avi‡Ki cwiwPwZ m¤ú‡K© ev †Kvb wnmv‡ei myweav‡fvMx ev bwgbx m¤ú‡K© †Kvbiƒc wg_¨v Z_¨ cÖ`vb Kwi‡eb bv|
(2) †Kvb e¨w³ Dc-aviv (1) Gi weavb jsNb Kwi‡j wZwb AbwaK 3 (wZb) ermi ch©šÍ Kviv`Ð ev Ab~aŸ© 50 (cÂvk) nvRvi UvKv ch©šÍ A_©`Ð ev Dfq `‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb|
9| Aciv‡ai Z`šÍ I wePvi:
(1) Ab¨ AvB‡b hvnv wKQyB _vKzK bv †Kb GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb Acivamg~n `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb AvBb, 2004 (2004 m‡bi 5bs AvBb) Gi Aaxb Zdwmjfy³ Aciva M‡Y¨ `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb ev Kwgkb nB‡Z Z`y‡Ï‡k¨ ÿgZvcÖvß Kwgk‡bi †Kvb Kg©KZ©v ev `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb nB‡Z ÿgZvcÖvß Ab¨ †Kvb Z`šÍKvix ms¯’vi Kg©KZ©v KZ…©K Z`šÍ‡hvM¨ nB‡e|
(2) GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb Acivamg~n Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Act XL of 1958) Gi section 3 Gi Aaxb wbhy³ †¯úkvj RR KZ…©K wePvh© nB‡e|
(3) Awfhy³ e¨w³i m¤úwË AbymÜvb I mbv³Ki‡Yi wbwgË `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki cvkvcvwk `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb AvBb, 2004 (2004 m‡bi 5bs AvBb) G cÖ`Ë ÿgZvI cÖ‡qvM Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges `ybx©wZ `gb Kwgkb nB‡Z ÿgZvcÖvß Ab¨ †Kvb Z`šÍKvix ms¯’vi Kg©KZ©v GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki cvkvcvwk Ab¨ AvB‡b cÖ`Ë ÿgZvI cÖ‡qvM Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|

10| †¯úkvj RR Gi we‡kl GLwZqvi:
(1) †¯úkvj RR GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb Aciv‡ai Rb¨ wba©vwiZ `Ð Av‡ivc Ges †ÿÎgZ, AwaKZi Z`šÍ, m¤úwË Aeiæ×KiY,μvK, ev‡RqvßKiY Av‡`kmn Avek¨K Ab¨ †Kvb Av‡`k cÖ`vb Kwi‡Z cvwi‡eb|
(2) †¯úkvj RR GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb `v‡qiK…Z †Kvb gvgjvq AwaKZi Z`‡šÍi Av‡`k cÖ`vb Kwi‡j D³iƒc Av‡`‡k Z`šÍKvix Kg©KZ©v‡K Z`šÍ cÖwZ‡e`b `vwL‡ji Rb¨ GKwU mgqmxgv wbw`©ó Kwiqv w`‡eb, hvnv 6 (Qq) gv‡mi AwaK nB‡e bv|
11| Aciv‡ai Avgj‡hvM¨Zv, A-Av‡cvl‡hvM¨Zv I A-Rvwgb‡hvM¨Zv:
GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb Acivamg~n Avgj‡hvM¨ (cognizable), A-Av‡cvl‡hvM¨ (non-compoundable) Ges A-Rvwgb‡hvM¨ (non-bailable) nB‡e|

22| Avcxj:
AvcvZZt ejer Ab¨ †Kvb AvB‡b hvnv wKQB _vKzb bv †Kb, Av`vjZ KZ…©K GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki Aaxb cÖ`Ë †Kvb Av‡`k, ivq, wWwμ ev Av‡ivwcZ `Û Øviv msÿzä cÿ, D³iƒc Av‡`k, ivq, wWwμ ev `Ûv‡`k cÖ`v‡bi ZvwiL nB‡Z 30 (wÎk) w`‡bi g‡a¨ nvB‡KvU© wefv‡M Avcxj Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|

23| gvwbjÛvwis Aciva `gb I cÖwZ‡iv‡a evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki ÿgZv I `vwqZ¡:

(1) GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki wbgoeiƒc ÿgZv I `vwqZ¡ _vwK‡e, h_v t
(K) †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v nB‡Z cÖvß bM` †jb‡`b I m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z Z_¨vw` we‡kølY ev ch©v‡jvPbv I we‡kølY ev ch©v‡jvPbvi D‡Ï‡k¨ AwZwi³ †h †Kvb Z_¨ wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v nB‡Z msMÖn Ges Dnvi WvUv msiÿY Kiv Ges †ÿÎgZ, mswkøó AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’v‡K cÖ‡qvRbxq Kvh©μg MÖn‡Yi Rb¨ D³ Z_¨vw` cÖ`vb Kiv;
(L) †Kvb †jb‡`b gvwbjÛvwis ev †Kvb m¤ú„³ Aciva Gi mwnZ m¤ú„³ ewjqv aviYv Kwievi hyw³msMZ KviY _vwK‡j wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v nB‡Z D³iƒc †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z †h †Kvb Z_¨ ev cÖwZ‡e`b msMÖn Kiv;
(M) †Kvb Aciva msNU‡bi gva¨‡g †Kvb A_© ev m¤úwË †Kvb wnmv‡e Rgv nBqv‡Q g‡g© m‡›`n Kwievi hyw³msMZ KviY _vwK‡j †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v‡K AbwaK 30 (wÎk) w`‡bi Rb¨ D³ wnmv‡ei †jb‡`b ¯’wMZ ev Aeiæ× ivwLevi wb‡`©k cÖ`vb Kiv t
Z‡e kZ© _v‡K †h, D³ wnmv‡ei †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z mwVK Z_¨ DrNvU‡bi cÖ‡qvRb †`Lv w`‡j †jb‡`b ¯’wMZ ev Aeiæ× ivwLevi †gqv` AwZwi³ 30 (wÎk) w`b Kwiqv m‡e©v”P 6 (Qq) gvm ewa©Z Kiv hvB‡e;
(N) gvwbjÛvwis cÖwZ‡iva Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v‡K, mgq mgq, cÖ‡qvRbxq wb‡`©kbv cÖ`vb Kiv;
(O) wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ…©K hvwPZ Z_¨ ev cÖwZ‡e`b mwVKfv‡e †cÖiY Kwiqv‡Q wKbv wKsev Z`&KZ…©K cÖ`Ë wb‡`©kbv h_vh_fv‡e cwicvjb Kwiqv‡Q wKbv Zvnv Z`viwK Kiv Ges cÖ‡qvR‡b, wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v m‡iRwgb cwi`k©b Kiv;
(P) GB AvB‡bi myôz cÖ‡qvM wbwðZ Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vmn evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki we‡ePbvq †h †Kvb ms¯’v ev cÖwZôv‡bi Kg©KZ©v I Kg©Pvix‡`i Rb¨ cÖwkÿ‡Yi e¨e¯’vmn mfv, †mwgbvi, BZ¨vw`i Av‡qvRb Kiv;
(Q) GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í cÖ‡qvRbxq Ab¨ †h †Kvb Kvh© m¤úv`b Kiv|
(2) gvwbjÛvwis ev m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b Z`‡šÍ Z`šÍKvix ms¯’v †Kvb Z_¨ mieiv‡ni Aby‡iva Kwi‡j, cÖPwjZ AvB‡bi AvIZvq ev hw` Ab¨ †Kvb Kvi‡Y eva¨eva¨KZv bv _v‡K, Zvnv nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ Z_¨ cÖ`vb Kwi‡e|
(3) †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v GB avivi Aaxb †Kvb hvwPZ Z_¨ h_vmg‡q mieivn Kwi‡Z e¨_© nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v‡K cÖwZw`b 10 (`k) nvRvi UvKv wnmv‡e m‡e©v”P 5 (cuvP) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges †Kvb ms¯’v 1 (GK) A_© erm‡i 3 (wZb) ev‡ii AwaK Rwigvbvi m¤§yLxb nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v ev ms¯’vi †Kvb kvLv, mvwf©m †m›Uvi, ey ev G‡R‡›Ui evsjv‡`‡k Kvh©μg cwiPvjbv iwnZ Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ wbeÜb ev jvB‡mÝ ¯’wMZ Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e ev †ÿÎgZ, wbeÜbKvix ev jvB‡mÝ cÖ`vbKvix KZ…©cÿ‡K D³ ms¯’vi weiæ‡× h_vh_ e¨e¯’v MÖn‡Yi wbwgË welqwU AewnZ Kwi‡e|
(4) †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v GB avivi Aaxb hvwPZ wel‡q †Kvb fyj ev wg_¨v Z_¨ ev weeiYx mieivn Kwi‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v‡K Ab~¨b 20 (wek) nvRvi UvKv I m‡e©v”P 5 (cuvP) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges †Kvb ms¯’v 1 (GK) A_© erm‡I 3 (wZb) ev‡ii AwaK Rwigvbvi m¤§yLxb nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v ev ms¯’vi †Kvb kvLv, mvwf©m †m›Uvi, ey ev G‡R‡›Ui evsjv‡`‡k Kvh©μg cwiPvjbv iwnZ Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ wbeÜb ev jvB‡mÝ ¯’wMZ Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e ev †ÿÎgZ, wbeÜbKvix ev jvB‡mÝ cÖ`vbKvix KZ…©cÿ‡K D³ ms¯’vi weiæ‡× h_vh_ e¨e¯’v MÖn‡Yi wbwgË welqwU AewnZ Kwi‡e|
(5) †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ…©K GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki AvIZvq RvixK…Z †Kvb wb‡`©kbv cwicvj‡b e¨_© nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v‡K cÖwZw`b 10 (`k) nvRvi UvKv wnmv‡e m‡e©v”P 5 (cuvP) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ cÖwZwU Acwicvjbxq wel‡qi Rb¨ Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges †Kvb ms¯’v 1 (GK) A_© erm‡i 3 (wZb) ev‡ii AwaK Rwigvbvi m¤§yLxb nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ ms¯’v ev ms¯’vi †Kvb kvLv, mvwf©m †m›Uvi, ey ev G‡R‡›Ui evsjv‡`‡k Kvh©μg cwiPvjbv iwnZ Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ wbeÜb ev jvB‡mÝ ¯’wMZ Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e ev †ÿÎgZ, wbeÜbKvix ev jvB‡mÝ cÖ`vbKvix KZ…©cÿ‡K D³ ms¯’vi weiæ‡× h_vh_ e¨e¯’v MÖn‡Yi wbwgË welqwU AewnZ Kwi‡e|
(6) †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v Dc-aviv (1) Gi `dv (M) Gi AvIZvq evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ…©K wb‡`©wkZ †Kvb Aeiæ× ev ¯’wMZ Av‡`k cwicvj‡b e¨_© nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK D³ wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v‡K Ab~¨b D³ e¨vsK wnmv‡e w¯’wZi mgcwigvY Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e hvnv wb‡`k©bv Rvixi Zvwi‡L wnmv‡e w¯’wZi wظ‡Yi AwaK nB‡e bv|
(7) GB AvB‡bi aviv 23 I 25 Abyhvqx evsjv‡`k e¨vsK KZ…©K Av‡ivwcZ Rwigvbv †Kvb& e¨w³ ev mËv ev wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v cÖ`v‡b e¨_© nB‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK mswkøó e¨w³ ev mËv ev wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi wbR bv‡g †h †Kvb e¨vsK ev Avw_©K cÖwZôvb ev evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡K cwiPvwjZ wnmve weKjbc~e©K Av`vq Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges G‡ÿ‡Î Rwigvbvi †Kvb Ask Abv`vqx _vwK‡j Zvnv Av`v‡q
cÖ‡qvR‡b evsjv‡`k e¨vsK Av`vj‡Z Av‡e`b Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges Av`vjZ †hBiƒc Dchy³ we‡ePbv Kwi‡e †mBiƒc Av‡`k cÖ`vb Kwi‡e|
(8) Dc-aviv (3), (4), (5) I (6) Abyhvqx †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v‡K Rwigvbv Kiv nB‡j GB Rb¨ `vqx D³ ms¯’vi gvwjK, cwiPvjK, Kg©KZ©v-Kg©Pvix ev Pzw³wfwËK wb‡qvwRZ e¨w³M‡Yi weiæ‡×I evsjv‡`k e¨vsK Ab~¨b 10(`k) nvRvi UvKv I m‡ev©”P 5(cuvP) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges cÖ‡qvR‡b mswkøó ms¯’v‡K cÖ‡qvRbxq cÖkvmwbK e¨e¯’v MÖn‡Yi Rb¨ wb‡`©kbv cÖ`vb Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|

24| evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU (BFIU) cÖwZôv:

(1) GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki aviv 23 G evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki Dci Awc©Z ÿgZv I `vwqZ¡ cwicvj‡bi j‡ÿ¨ evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡K evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU (Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit ev BFIU) bv‡g GKwU ¯^Zš¿ BDwbU _vwK‡e|
(2) GB Aa¨v‡`‡ki D‡Ïk¨ c~iYK‡í miKvwi, Avav-miKvwi, ¯^vqËkvwmZ ms¯’vmg~n ev Ab¨ †Kvb mswkøó cÖwZôvb ev ms¯’v Z`&KZ…©K msiwÿZ ev msM„nxZ Z_¨vw` evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU‡K ¯^cÖ‡bvw`Zfv‡e ev Aby‡iv‡ai m~‡Î mieivn Kwi‡e|
(3) evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU Ab¨vb¨ AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’v‡K gvwb jÛvwis I mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_© †hvMvb mswkøó Z_¨vw` cÖ‡qvR‡b ¯^-D‡`¨v‡M mieivn Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|
(4) GB AvB‡bi weavb Abyhvqx Ab¨ †Kvb †`‡ki mwnZ m¤úvw`Z †Kvb Pyw³ ev e¨e¯’vi Aaxb mswkøó †`‡ki dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU‡K gvwbjÛvwis ev mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vqb ev †Kvb m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z Z_¨vw` mieivn Kwi‡e Ges Ab¨ †Kvb †`‡ki wbKU nB‡Z Abyiƒc Z_¨ Pvwn‡Z cwi‡e|
(5) Dc-aviv (4) G ewY©Z Pyw³ ev e¨e¯’v QvovI evsjv‡`k dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU †ÿÎgZ, ¯^cÖ‡Yvw`Zfv‡e Ab¨ †`‡ki dvBb¨vwÝqvj B‡›Uwj‡RÝ BDwbU‡K Z_¨ mieivn Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e|


25| gvwbjÛvwis Aciva cÖwZ‡iv‡a wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi `vq-`vwqZ¡:

(1) gvwbjÛvwis Aciva cÖwZ‡iv‡a wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi wbgoeiƒc `vq-`vwqZ¡ _vwK‡e, h_v t
(K) Dnvi MÖvn‡Ki wnmve cwiPvjbvKv‡j MÖvn‡Ki cwiwPwZi mwVK I c~Y©v½ Z_¨ msiÿY Kiv;
(L) †Kvb MÖvn‡Ki wnmve eÜ nB‡j eÜ nBevi ZvwiL nB‡Z Ab~¨b 5 (cuvP) ermi ch©šÍ D³ wnmv‡ei †jb‡`b msμvšI Z_¨ msiÿY Kiv;
(M) `dv (K) I (L) Gi Aaxb msiwÿZ Z_¨vw` evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki Pvwn`v †gvZv‡eK, mgq mgq, mieivn Kiv;
(N) aviv 2 (h) G msÁvwqZ †Kvb m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b ev †jb‡`‡bi cÖ‡Póv cwijwÿZ nB‡j ¯^-D‡`¨v‡M Awej‡¤^ evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡K Ôm‡›`nRbK †jb`b wi‡cvU©Õ Kiv|
(2) †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v Dc-aviv (1) Gi weavb jsNb Kwi‡j evsjv‡`k e¨vsK-
(K) D³ ms¯’v‡K Ab~¨b 50 (cÂvk) nvRvi UvKv Ges m‡e©v”P 25 (cuwPk) jÿ UvKv ch©šÍ Rwigvbv Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e; Ges
(L) `dv (K) Gi Aaxb Av‡ivwcZ Rwigvbvi AwZwi³ D³ ms¯’v ev ms¯’vi †Kvb kvLv, mvwf©m †m›Uvi, ey ev G‡R‡›Ui e¨emvwqK Kvh©μ‡gi AbygwZ ev jvB‡mÝ evwZj Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e ev †ÿÎgZ, wbeÜbKvix ev jvB‡mÝ cÖ`vbKvix KZ…©cÿ‡K D³ ms¯’vi weiæ‡× h_vh_ e¨e¯’v MÖn‡Yi wbwg‡Ë welqwU AewnZ Kwi‡e|
(3) Dc-aviv (2) Gi Aaxb Av‡ivwcZ Rwigvbvi A_© evsjv‡`k e¨vsK ZrKZ…©K wba©vwiZ c×wZ‡Z Av`vq Kwi‡e Ges Av`vqK…Z A_© ivóªxq †KvlvMv‡i Rgv Kwi‡e|

1.3 What Is Terrorist Financing

Terrorist financing can be simply defined as financial support in any form of terrorism or of  those who encourage, plan, or engage in terrorism. The International Convention for 1 Predicate offence is the underlying criminal activity that generated proceeds, which when laundered, results in the offense of money laundering.

the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) under the United Nations defines TF in the following manner:
1. If any person commits an offense by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willingly, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
a. An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or
b. Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking any active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act.
2. (Deleted by UN)
3. For an act to constitute an offense set forth in the preceding paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an offense referred to in said paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b)2.

Some countries face difficulties in defining terrorism as not all countries have adopted the conventions agreed on specifically what actions constitute terrorism. In addition, the meaning of terrorism is not universally accepted due to significant political, religious and national implications that differ from country to country. FATF, which is recognized as the international standard setter for combating financing of terrorism (CFT) efforts, does not specifically define the term financing of terrorism in its nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Special Recommendations). Nonetheless, FATF urges countries to ratify and implement the 1999 United Nations International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Thus, the above definition is the one most countries have adopted for purposes of defining terrorist financing.
According to the article 7 of the Anti Terrorism Act, 2009, financing of terrorism means:
2 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), Article,http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm. The treaties referred to annex in sub‐paragraph 1(a) shall be available in this web link.
(1) Whoever provides or incites to provide money, service or property and intends that it should be used, or has reasonable ground to suspect that it will or may be used for the purpose of terrorist acts; commits an act of terrorist financing.
(2) Whoever receives money, service or property and intends that it should be used, or has reasonable ground to suspect that it will or may be used for the purpose of terrorist acts; commits an act of terrorist financing.
(3) Whoever arranges money, service or property and intends that it should be used, or has reasonable ground to suspect that it will or may be used for the purpose of terrorist acts; commits an act of terrorist financing.
(4) A person guilty of the offence as described in the subsections from 1 to 3 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years and it shall not be less than three years, to which fine may also be added.

4| 2009 m‡bi 16 bs AvB‡bi aviv 5 Gi cÖwZ¯’vcb| D³ AvB‡bi aviv 5 Gi cwie‡Z© wbgoeiƒc aviv 5 cÖwZ¯’vwcZ nB‡e, h_v t
Ò5| AwZivwóªK cÖ‡qvM|(1) hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv evsjv‡`‡ki evwni nB‡Z evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨šÍ‡i †Kvb Aciva msNUb K‡i hvnv D³ e¨w³ ev mËv KZ…©K evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨šÍi nB‡Z msNwUZ nB‡j GB AvB‡bi Aaxb kvw¯Í‡hvM¨ nBZ, Zvnv nB‡j D³ Aciva evsjv‡`‡k msNwUZ nBqv‡Q ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e Ges D³ e¨w³ ev mËv I Aciv‡ai †ÿ‡Î GB AvB‡bi weavbvejx cÖ‡hvR¨ nB‡e|
(2) hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv evsjv‡`‡ki Af¨šÍi nB‡Z evsjv‡`‡ki evwn‡i †Kvb Aciva msNUb K‡i, hvnv evsjv‡`‡k msNwUZ nB‡j GB AvB‡bi Aaxb kv¯Í‡hvM¨ nBZ, Zvnv nB‡j D³ Aciva evsjv‡`‡k msNwUZ nBqv‡Q ewjqv MY¨ nB‡e Ges D³ e¨w³ ev mËv I Aciv‡ai †ÿ‡Î GB AvB‡bi weavbvejx cÖ‡hvR¨ nB‡e|Ó|

6| 2009 m‡bi 16 bs AvB‡bi aviv 7 Gi cÖwZ¯’vcb 
D³ AvB‡bi aviv 7 Gi cwie‡Z© wbgoeiƒc aviv 7 cÖwZ¯’vwcZ nB‡e, h_v t
Ò7| mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vqb msμvšI Aciva|
(1) hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv ÁvZmv‡I Ab¨ †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv‡K A_©, †mev-e¯‘MZ mnvqZv (material support), ev Ab¨ †Kvb m¤úwË mieivn K‡ib ev mieiv‡ni AwfcÖvq cÖKvk K‡ib hvnv‡Z Bnv wek¦vm Kwievi hyw³m½Z KviY _v‡K †h, Dnv m¤ú~Y© ev AvswkKfv‡e †Kvb mš¿vmx e¨w³ ev mËv ev †Mvôx ev msMVb KZ…©K †h †Kvb D‡Ï‡k¨ e¨envi Kiv nBqv‡Q ev nB‡Z cv‡i, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb ev D³ mËv mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vq‡bi Aciva msNUb Kwiqv‡Qb ewjqv MY¨ nB‡eb| 2| hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv ÁvZmv‡i Ab¨ †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËvi wbKU nB‡Z A_©, †mev, e¯‘MZ mnZvq (material support) , ev Ab¨ †Kvb m¤úwË MÖnY K‡ib hvnv‡Z Bnv wek¦vm Kwievi hyw³m½Z KviY _v‡K †h, Dnv m¤ú~Y© ev AvswkKfv‡e †Kvb mš¿vmx e¨w³ ev mËv ev †Mvôx ev msMVb KZ…©K †h †Kvb D‡Ï‡k¨ e¨envi Kiv nBqv‡Q ev nB‡Z cv‡i, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb ev D³ mËv mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vq‡bi Aciva msNUb Kwiqv‡Qb ewjqv MY¨ nB‡eb|
(3) hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv ÁvZmv‡i Ab¨ †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËvi Rb¨ A_©, †mev, e¯‘MZ mnvqZv (material support), ev Ab¨ †Kvb m¤úwËi e¨e¯’v K‡ib hvnv‡Z Bnv wek¦vm Kwievi hyw³m½Z KviY _v‡K †h, Dnv m¤ú~Y© ev AvswkKfv‡e †Kvb mš¿vmx e¨w³ ev mËv ev †Mvôx ev msMVb KZ…©K †h †Kvb D‡Ï‡k¨ e¨envi Kiv nBqv‡Q ev nB‡Z cv‡i, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb ev D³ mËv mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vq‡bi Aciva msNUb Kwiqv‡Qb ewjqv MY¨ nB‡eb|
(4) hw` †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv ÁvZmv‡i Ab¨ †Kvb e¨w³ ev mËv‡K A_©, †mev, e¯‘MZ mnvqZv (material support), ev Ab¨ †Kvb m¤úwË mieivn ev MÖnY ev e¨e¯’v Kwievi †ÿ‡Î Ggbfv‡e cÖ‡ivwPZ K‡ib hvnv‡Z Bnv wek¦vm Kwievi hyw³msMZ KviY _v‡K †h, Dnv m¤ú~Y© ev AvswkKfv‡e †Kvb mš¿vmx e¨w³ ev mËv ev †Mvôx ev msMVb KZ…©K †h †Kvb D‡Ï‡k¨ e¨envi Kiv nBqv‡Q ev nB‡Z cv‡i, Zvnv nB‡j wZwb ev D³ mËv mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vq‡bi Aciva msNUb Kwiqv‡Qb ewjqv MY¨ nB‡eb|
(5) Dc-aviv (1) nB‡Z (4) G ewY©Z Aciv‡a †Kvb e¨w³ †`vl mve¨¯Í nB‡j, D³ e¨w³ AbwaK wek ermi I Ab~¨b Pvi ermi ch©šÍ †h †Kvb †gqv‡`i Kviv`‡Ð `wÐZ nB‡eb, Ges Bnvi AwZwi³ Aciv‡ai mwnZ mswkøó m¤úwËi wظY g~‡j¨i mgcwigvY ev 10(`k) jÿ UvKv, hvnv AwaK, †mB cwigvY A_©`ÐI Av‡ivc Kiv hvB‡e|
(6) (K) Dc-aviv (1) nB‡Z (4) G ewY©Z Aciv‡a †Kvb mËv †`vlx mve¨¯Í nB‡j aviv 18 Gi weavb Abyhvqx e¨e¯’v MÖnY Kiv hvB‡e Ges Bnvi AwZwi³ Aciv‡ai mwnZ mswkøó m¤úwËi wZb¸Y g~‡j¨i mgcwigvY ev 50 (cÂvk) jÿ UvKv, hvnv AwaK, †mB cwigvY A_©`ÐI Av‡ivc Kiv hvB‡e; Ges
(6) (L) D³ mËvi cÖavb, Zvnv‡K †Pqvig¨vb, e¨e¯’vcbv cwiPvjK, cÖavb wbe©vnx ev Ab¨ †h †Kvb bv‡g WvKv nBK bv †Kb, wZwb AbwaK wek ermi I Ab~¨b Pvi ermi ch©šÍ †h †Kvb †gqv‡`i Kviv`‡Û `wÐZ nB‡eb, Ges Bnvi AwZwi³ Aciv‡ai mwnZ mswkøó m¤úwËi wظY g~‡j¨i mgcwigvY ev 20 (wek) jÿ UvKv, hvnv AwaK, †mB cwigvY A_©`‡ÐI `wÐZ nB‡eb hw` bv wZwb cÖgvY Kwi‡Z mÿg nb †h, D³ Aciva Zvnvi AÁvZmv‡i msNwUZ nBqv‡Q A_ev D³ Aciva †iva Kwievi Rb¨ wZwb h_vmva¨ †Póv Kwiqv‡Qb|Ó|

8| 2009 m‡bi 16 bs AvB‡bi aviv 15 Gi cÖwZ¯’vcb D³ AvB‡bi aviv 15 Gi
cwie‡Z© wbgoeiƒc aviv 15 cÖwZ¯’vwcZ nB‡e, h_v t
Ò15| evsjv‡`k e¨vs‡Ki ÿgZv
(1) GB AvB‡bi Aaxb †Kvb Aciva msNU‡bi D‡Ï‡k¨ †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi gva¨‡g †jb‡`b cÖwZ‡iva I mbv³ Kwi‡Z evsjv‡`k e¨vsK cÖ‡qvRbxq c`‡ÿc MÖnY Kwi‡Z cvwi‡e Ges GZ`y‡Ï‡k¨ Dnvi wbgoeewY©Z ÿgZv I KZ…©Z¡ _vwK‡e, h_v t
(K) †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v nB‡Z m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z cÖwZ‡e`b Zje Kiv;
(L) Dc-`dv (K) Abyhvqx cÖvß cÖwZ‡e`b mswkøó AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’v‡K cÖ‡qvRbxq Kvh©μg MÖn‡Yi Rb¨ cÖ`vb Kiv ev †ÿÎgZ, ˆe‡`wkK AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’vi Aby‡iv‡ai †cÖwÿ‡Z D³ ms¯’v‡K cÖ`vb Kiv ev D³ cÖwZ‡e`‡bi wel‡q Z_¨ wewbgq Kiv;
(M) mKj cwimsL¨vb I †iKW© msKjb I msiÿY Kiv;
(N) mKj m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z wi‡cv‡U©i WvUv-†eR m„wó I iÿYv‡eÿY Kiv;
(O) m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z cÖwZ‡e`b we‡kølY Kiv;
(P) †Kvb †jb‡`b mš¿vmx Kv‡h©i mwnZ m¤ú„³ g‡g© m‡›`n Kwievi hyw³m½Z KviY _vwK‡j mswkøó wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v‡K D³ †jb‡`‡bi wnmve AbwaK 30 (wÎk) w`‡bi Rb¨ ¯’wMZ ev Aeiæ× ivwLevi D‡Ïk¨ wjwLZ Av‡`k Rvix Kiv Ges GBiƒ‡c D³ wnmv‡ei †jb‡`b m¤úwK©Z mwVK Z_¨ D˜NvU‡bi cÖ‡qvRb †`Lv w`‡j †jb‡`b ¯’wMZ ev Aeiæ× ivwLevi †gqv`
AwZwi³ 30 (wÎk) w`b Kwiqv m‡e©v”P 6(Qq) gvm ewa©Z Kiv;
(Q) wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vi Kvh©vejx cwiexÿY I Z`viK Kiv;
(R) mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_© †hvMvb cÖwZnZ Kwievi D‡Ï‡k¨ cÖwZ‡ivag~jK c`‡ÿc MÖn‡Y wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vmg~n‡K wb‡`©k cÖ`vb Kiv;
(S) mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_©vq‡bi mwnZ RwoZ m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b mbv‡³i D‡Ï‡k¨ wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vmg~n cwi`k©b Kiv; Ges
(T) mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_© †hvMv‡bi mwnZ RwoZ m‡›`nRbK †jb‡`b mbv³ I cÖwZ‡iv‡ai D‡Ï‡k¨ wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’vmg~‡ni Kg©KZ©v I Kg©PvixMY‡K cÖwkÿY cÖ`vb Kiv|
(2) evsjv‡`k e¨vsK, mš¿vmx Kv‡h© A_© †hvMv‡bi mwnZ RwoZ m‡›`nRbK †Kvb †jb‡`‡bi welq †Kvb wi‡cvU© cÖ`vbKvix ms¯’v ev Bnvi MÖvnK‡K mbv³ Kwievi m‡½ m‡½, Dnv h_vh_ AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’v‡K AewnZ Kwi‡e Ges AbymÜvb I Z`šÍ Kv‡h© D³ AvBb cÖ‡qvMKvix ms¯’v‡K cÖ‡qvRbxq mKj cÖKvi mn‡hvwMZv cÖ`vb Kwi‡e|
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1.4 The Link between Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
The techniques used to launder money are essentially the same as those used to conceal the sources of, and uses for, terrorist financing. Funds used to support terrorism may originate from legitimate sources, criminal activities, or both. Nonetheless, disguising the source of terrorist financing, regardless of whether the source is of legitimate or illicit origin, is important. If the source can be concealed, it remains available for future terrorist financing activities. Similarly, it is important for terrorists to conceal the use of the funds so that the financing activity goes undetected.

For these reasons, FATF has recommended that each country criminalizes the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations, and designates such offenses as predicate offenses of money laundering. Finally, FATF has stated that the nine Special Recommendations combined with The Forty Recommendations on money laundering constitute the basic framework for preventing, detecting and suppressing both money laundering and terrorist financing.

As noted above, a significant difference between money laundering and terrorist financing is that the funds involved in terrorist financing may originate from legitimate sources as well as criminal activities. Such legitimate sources may include donations or gifts of cash or other assets to persons/organizations (e.g. foundations or charities) to support terrorist activities.

1.5 The reason of committing money laundering

Criminals engage in money laundering for three main reasons:

First, money represents the lifeblood of the organization that engages in criminal conduct for financial gain because it covers operating expenses, replenishes inventories, purchases the services of corrupt officials to escape detection and further the interests of the illegal enterprise, and pays for an extravagant lifestyle. To spend money in these ways, criminals must make the money they derived illegally appear legitimate.
Second, a trail of money from an offense to criminals can become incriminating evidence. Criminals must obscure or hide the source of their wealth or alternatively disguise ownership or control to ensure that illicit proceeds are not used to prosecute them.
Third, the proceeds from crime often become the target of investigation and seizure. To shield ill-gotten gains from suspicion and protect them from seizure, criminals must conceal their existence or, alternatively, make them look legitimate.

1.6 The reason of committing terrorism financing
Terrorism financing is done mainly to facilitate an extremist group by providing financial support aiming to establish or circulate their ideology. Such financial assistance may be provided directly or indirectly or may be attempted and amount of money may be significantly low with several in numbers.
1.7 Laundering Techniques
Obviously there is no single way of laundering money or any other property. It can range from the simple method to highly complex schemes involving a web of international businesses and investments. In general, money laundering process comprises three stages:
Placement – placing the criminal funds into the financial system directly or  indirectly.
Layering – the process of separating criminal proceeds from their source by using complex layers of financial transactions designed to hide the audit trail and provide anonymity.
Integration – if the layering process succeeds, integration schemes place the laundered proceeds back into the legitimate economy in such a way that they appear to be legitimate.

This “three stages model” is more often occur simultaneously or overlap depending on the facilities of the launderer, the requirements of the criminals, and on the robustness, or otherwise, of the regulatory and legal requirements.

Chapter 2: Vulnerabilities of ML/TF

2.1 Introduction
Criminals and terrorists succeed largely in concealing the origins or sources of their funds and sanitize the proceeds by moving them through national and international financial systems. Money laundering and the financing of terrorism have particularly significant economic and social consequences for a developing country like Bangladesh. The absence of, or a lax in AML/CFT regime in a particular country encourages criminals and terrorists to operate and expand their criminal pursuits fostering illegal activities such as corruption, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking and exploitation of human beings, arms trafficking, smuggling.

2.2 The Adverse Implications for Developing Countries
The magnitude of the adverse impact of money laundering and terrorist financing cannot be quantified with the precisions. There are so many adverse effects of money laundering and terrorist financing for a developing country like Bangladesh. Some of them are describes below:
2.2.1 Increased Crime and Corruption
If money laundering is prevalent in a country, it enhances crime and corruption in different ways. To the extent that a country is viewed as a safe haven for money laundering, it is likely to attract criminals and promote corruption. Safe haven includes-
weak AML/CFT framework,
little enforcement of AML/CFT provisions,
limited number of predicate offences,
limited inclusion of reporting institutions,
ineffective penalties etc.
A comprehensive and effective AML/CFT framework, together with timely implementation and effective enforcement significantly reduce the profitable aspects of criminal activities and discourage criminals and terrorists. This is especially true when the proceeds from criminal activities are aggressively confiscated and forfeited as part of a country’s overall AML/CFT legal framework.

2.2.2 Non-cooperation from Foreign Counterparts
Foreign financial institutions may decide to limit their transactions with institutions from money laundering havens, subject these transactions to extra scrutiny making them more expensive, or terminate correspondent or lending relationships altogether. Even legitimate businesses and enterprises from money laundering havens may suffer from reduced access to world markets or access at a higher cost due to extra scrutiny of their ownership, organization and control systems.
Any country known for lax enforcement of AML/CFT is less likely to receive foreign private investment. For developing nations, eligibility for foreign governmental assistance is also likely to be severely limited.
Foreign direct investment and foreign aid may be reduced or withdrawn because of lax enforcement of AML/CFT measures.
Finally, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering maintains a list of countries that do not comply with AML requirements or that do not cooperate sufficiently in the fight against money laundering i.e. “non-cooperating countries and territories” (NCCT) list, gives public notice that the listed country does not have in place even minimum standards. Beyond the negative impacts referred to here, individual FATF member countries could also impose specific counter-measures against a country that does not take action to remedy its AML/CFT deficiencies.

2.2.3 Compromised Economy and Private Sector
Money launderers may use front companies3 to co-mingle the illicit funds with legitimate funds in order to hide the ill-gotten proceeds, not to earn profit. Access to illicit funds let front companies to subsidize the front company’s products and services, even at belowmarket prices. As a consequence, legitimate companies find it difficult to compete with such front companies. Thus by using front companies and other investments in legitimate companies money laundering proceeds can be utilized to control whole industry or sectors of the economy of certain countries. This increases the potential for monetary and economic instability due to the misallocation of resources from artificial distortions in asset and commodity prices. It also provides a vehicle for evading taxation, thus depriving the country of revenue.
3 Business enterprises that appear legitimate and engage in legitimate business but are, in fact, controlled by criminals

2.2.4. Damaged Privatization Efforts
Money launderers threaten the efforts of many countries to reform their economies through privatization. These criminal organizations are capable of outbidding legitimate purchasers of former state-owned enterprises. When illicit proceeds are invested in this manner, criminals increase their potential for more criminal activities and corruption, as well as deprive the country of what should be legitimate, market-based, taxpaying enterprise.
2.3 Vulnerabilities of Remittance Business
2.3.1. One of the main techniques commonly used at present is the conversion of large amounts of criminal proceeds in local currency into low bulk foreign currencies for physical smuggling out of the country. Some countries also evidenced the use of international money orders and mail services to send large sums of cash abroad.
2.3.2. Remittances is often used in the layering process. One of the most popular techniques is simply to transfer illicit funds through several different remittance operators to disguise the trail to the funds’ original sources.
2.3.3. Another method is to make transfers from numerous accounts to a principal collection account which is often located in offshore financial centre.
2.3.4. Transfers are also made under false identities and sometimes it becomes difficult to identify the actual recipient of the funds.
2.3.5. Remittance operators, which traditionally encompass the non-banking segment of the population, notably immigrant workers or any other person having no bank account often transfer funds to the countries where banking services are less regulated. Looking at the vulnerability of remittance service industry, the respective institutions should therefore be more vigilant to evolving money laundering and financing of terrorism threats to prevent their institutions from being abused to facilitate money laundering and financing of terrorism activities.
2.4 The Benefits of an Effective AML/CFT Framework
A strong AML/CFT institutional framework that includes a broad scope of predicate offenses for money laundering helps to fight against crime and corruption. An effective AML/CFT regime is deterrent to criminal activities. In this regard, confiscation and forfeiture of money laundering proceeds impedes to earn profits from criminal activities, thereby reducing the incentive to commit criminal acts.
In addition, an effective AML/CFT regime reduces the possibilities of losses to the institutions originating from fraudulent activities. Proper customer identification procedures and determination of beneficial ownership provide specific due diligence for higher risk policies and ensure monitoring for suspicious activities. Such prudential internal controls play a vital role for the safe and sound operation of a financial institution. This enhances public confidence and permits investments to be put into productive purposes that respond to consumer needs and help the productivity of the overall economy.

*       


AML and CFT Policy of AB Bank Limited








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BFIU & AML Circulars

BFIU Circular- 1/2012 Dated- January 30, 2012
Regarding the formation of Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit in replace of AML Dept.

BFIU Circular- 2/2012 Dated- March 15, 2012
Anti Money Laundering Act & Anti Terrorism (amenedment) Act 2012.

AML Circular- 01/2002 Dated- May 18, 2002
Money Laundering Prevention Act - 2002

AML Circular- 02/2002 Dated- July 17, 2002
KYC, Legal Identification, Personal Information, Business Information, Transaction information, Proof of address, ETP, STR & Not to disclose the STR related information to any one, Transaction Monitoring, establishment of CCU in Head Office, CAMLCO & BAMLCO and Training & Record Keeping.

AML Circular- 03/2002 Dated- December 10, 2002
- It is amendment of Circular-02.
- Certificate issued by the trespectable person of the society acceptable to the Bank/FI subject to their satisfaction.

AML Circular- 04/2002 Dated- December 23, 2002
Co-operation to investigate the crime related to Money Laundering.

AML Circular- 05/2003 Dated- May 22, 2003
Amendment of Money Laundering Prevention Act - 2002

AML Circular- 06/2005 Dated- July 24, 2005
KYC Procedures

AML Circular- 07/2005 Dated- August 14, 2005
Corresponding Banking/ Shell Banking

AML Circular- 08, 09, 10
Cash Transaction Reporting Procedures]

AML Circular- 11/2007 Dated- February 20, 2007
Freezing of Accounts under emergency rule - 2007

AML Circular- 12/2007 Dated- September 20, 2007
AML (amendment) ordinance – 2007.



AML Circular- 13/2007  Dated- September 24, 2007
CTR threshold extended from Tk. 5.00 lac to Tk. 7.00 lac and above effective from September, 2007.

AML Circular- 14/2007 Dated- September 24, 2007
-          PEPs Definition : Individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, for example Heads of State or of government, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials. Business relationships with family members or close associates of PEPs involve reputational risks similar to those with PEPs themselves.
-          Approval from HO
-          FATF recommendation -2012 domestic PEPs
-          Beneficial Owners of PEPs.

AML Circular- 15/2008 Dated- March 24, 2008
Self assessment & Independent testing

AML Circular- 16/2008 Dated- April 29, 2008
AML Ordinance – 2008.

AML Circular- 17/2008 Dated- June 29, 2008
Anti Terrorism Ordinance - 2008

AML Circular- 18/2008 Dated- August 10, 2008
Included Insurance Company as Reporting Agency

AML Circular- 19/2008 Dated- August 14, 2008
-          Instruction to Bank & FIs according to AML Ordinance-2008 & Anti terrorism Ordinance-2008.
-          Latest STR form
-          CFT rsponsibilities- CCU & CAMLCO
-          Staff responsibility to be circulated by the Board of Directors.

AML Circular- 20/2008 Dated- August 14, 2008
Instruction to Money changer according to AML Ordinance-2008 & Anti terrorism Ordinance-2008.

AML Circular- 21/2009 Dated- April 21, 2009
Money Laundering Prevention Act – 2009 published in Bangladesh Gagette.

AML Circular- 22/2009 Dated- April 21, 2009
Anti Terrorism Act -2009 published in Bangladesh Gagette.

AML Circular- 23/2010 Dated- February 23, 2010
Completing KYC Procedures of Accounts which opened before April 30, 2002.

AML Circular- 24/2010 Dated- March 03, 2010
-          Definition of Customer
-          Beneficial owner/controller of owner
-          CDD (Customer due diligence), EDD
-          Corresponding Banking
-          Screening Mechanism for new recruitment
-          Customer awareness


AML Circular- 25/2010 Dated- May 30, 2010
USD 50,000.00 or above in fav. Of Electronic Media

AML Circular- 26/2010 Dated- September 30, 2010
Area of predicate offence & Reporting Agency extended/included newly.

AML Circular- 27/2011 Dated- June 15, 2011
Instruction to the Non-Government Organization (NGO) and Non-Profit Organization (NPO) for compliance of AML/CFT.

AML Circular- 28/2011 Dated- July 05, 2011
Guidance Notes on AML & CFT for Insurance Companies.

AML Circular- 29/2011 Dated- September 27, 2011
Guidance Notes on Anti Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism for Money Changers.